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1 Introduction
It is a common empirical observation that the dispersions of market shares, payoffs, revenues,
consumption or income display a substantial amount of inequality. One source of such market-
borne inequality are differences between the various agents, e.g., in endowments, abilities, in-
formation, inclinations or alike.
What seems to be less understood is the extent to which the market inequality originat-
ing from ex ante heterogeneous agents is influenced by market conditions that affect one or
all agents. To illustrate the latter in case of firms, this could amount to the total disposable
consumer income, the overall level of productive efficiency, a sales tax, the level of available
production resources, the overall propensity of consumers to substitute between products, or
the advertising affinity of consumers. A change in such market conditions influences each firm,
and the corresponding responses depend on the direct impact of the changed condition alongside
with the reactions of all other market participants. This amalgam of effects makes it hard to
analyze how inequality in market shares or payoffs evolves.
In this article, we study how the dispersion of market shares and related measures depends on
exogenous market conditions. In the general setting, an arbitrary number of ex ante heteroge-
neous agents choose their actions such as to maximize their payoffs. The dispersion of market
shares then is the equilibrium consequence of these actions. We express such a competitive situa-
tion as a “competition for market shares”, where the agents compete directly in terms of market
shares. This setup can accommodate different paradigms of competition, such as monopolistic
competition, price competition or competition for prizes, with a contextual interpretation of
what market shares are. Formulating these models as a competition for market shares allows
us to identify structural relations between the otherwise different models of competition, which
provides valuable guidelines for understanding conceptual similarities – or disparities – in the
respective equilibrium inequality effects.
A change in a market condition may exacerbate or reduce the existing market inequality, and
one might care about such effects for several reasons. For instance, a regulating authority may
want to assess which market-level interventions (e.g., taxes or quotas) affect market concentra-
tion or the sales distribution on the supply-side, or whether it moderates consumption inequality
on the demand-side. Policy makers frequently need to render an account for the inequality in
the chances of winning a grant, patent or a monopoly franchise. Sports tournament designers
often care about finding a reward scheme that makes the competition most unpredictable. For
empirical work it may be helpful to know whether a certain inequality pattern in a market is
“robust” in thus that specific distributional assumption about the ex-ante agent heterogeneity
is not decisive. Such insights could be particularly useful if the data does not allow to identify
the ex-ante agent heterogeneity, such as producer-side cost functions.
We derive a set of formal results to analyze the equilibrium inequality effects if a market condi-
tion changes, where this market condition can affect the payoffs of all or only some agents – we
only require that there is no equilibrium “leap-frogging” by some agents in terms of their mar-
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ket shares. We say that a market condition induces inequality effects whenever the equilibrium
market shares are not invariant to variations of this condition.
Our first results characterize whether any such inequality effects arise for a given market con-
dition x. We prove that this question can be completely answered by restricting attention to a
local property – the “direct-aggregative effect” – of an equilibrium equation, which originates
from the agent-wise optimality conditions and is “type-recursive” (i.e., recursive in the agents’
identities). A change in x can affect marginal costs and benefits directly as well as indirectly
via the aggregate response of all agents – the direct-aggregative effect is the net effect of the two.
In our framework, the ex ante agent heterogeneity is necessary and sufficient for a non-uniform
dispersion of market shares to arise - but does this dispersion become more or less equal if a
certain market condition changes? The second set of results addresses this question by centering
on equilibrium rotations of the market share dispersions. These rotations can be directed “out-
ward” or “inward”, the former implying an increasing and the latter a decreasing equilibrium
inequality.
We show that the direct-aggregative effect can determine the existence of rotations, and their
directions. This yields a powerful tool for studying inequality effects, as the direct-aggregative
effect is a local property of a single equation which nevertheless is informative about a global
property of a distribution.
For example, we use this insight to prove that the elasticities of marginal costs alone determine
whether a rotation occurs following an increase in a “level variable”. A level variable is a market
condition that affects the marginal benefits (or costs) of all agents by the same proportion,
thereby inducing the same incentives for all agents to aspire for a larger market share. If the
agents with a larger current market share are also those featuring a less elastic marginal cost
function, then an increase in a level variable causes an outward rotation of the market share
function, reflecting that these agents can adapt better to the new situation by means of their
costs.
The notion of a rotation is related to the concept of Lorenz dominance, which plays a central
role in empirical inequality analysis. Specifically, an outward (inward) rotation of the market
shares means that market inequality has increased (decreased) as measured by any Lorenz-
consistent inequality measure (such as the Gini coefficient).
Our general analysis identifies a central role of power functions. If the type-recursive equation is
such that the “costs” and “benefits” associated with attaining a certain market share are power
functions, and the direct-aggregative effect pertaining to a market condition has the same sign
for all agents, then any inequality effect must take on the form of a rotation that is monotonic
in agent type. That is, the changes in market shares must be ordered such that stronger agents
must gain (or lose) more, in a relative sense, compared to any weaker agent. Such insights
matter as power functions arise in many economic models and similar applications (Newman,
2005).
With power functions, more can be said about the relation between the dispersion of market
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and payoff shares. For example, we show that if the revenues per unit of market shares are
identical across agents, amounting to a symmetric type of competition, then the market and
payoff shares must always coincide. By contrast, if agents with larger market shares also earn
a higher revenue per unit of market share, then the payoffs are less equally dispersed than the
market shares. Further, we derive sufficient conditions for the market and payoff shares to
respond similarly to changes in a market condition.
We put our inequality tools into action in several applications from different fields, such as
monopolistic competition, perfect competition, and a class of models where agent interaction is
described as a competition for prize.1 While these models feature substantially different forms
of competition, we observe a great deal of likeness in the inequality effects they predict. The
reason for this finding is that the underlying competition for market shares follows a common
formal structure, despite the different competition settings.
Our approach provides several novel insights within the specific applications we consider.
As of its basic contribution, our article complements a recent literature focusing on how the
distribution of the ex ante agent heterogeneity affects the dispersion of certain equilibrium
quantities. For example, Mrázová et al. (2016) relate the distribution of firm sales and markups
to the underlying distribution of technology in a monopolistic competition setting, or Jensen
(2017) studies how exogenous changes in the ex-ante distribution, such as increased uncertainty
in a prior belief, may affect certain outcomes. By contrast, we predominantly ask when a
change in the economic environment makes advantaged agents more dominant holding the ex
ante agent heterogeneity fixed, or when it moderates market concentration and diminishes the
market advantages originating from favorable ex ante conditions of certain agents. Nevertheless,
our approach is also suitable to study the inequality effects induced by a change in the ex ante
agent heterogeneity itself.
Article structure We define the concept of a competition for market shares in Section 2, and
introduce the key definitions, such as the ex ante agent heterogeneity (the “agent types”) or the
notions of a market condition or inequality effects. In Section 3 we derive the type-recursive
equation which characterizes the possible inequality effects, and define the notion of a rotation
as a key inequality concept for our applications. We apply our formal approach to a number of
examples in Section 4. All proofs of the formal claims made in the main text can be found in
Appendix A, while Appendix B contains additional results pertaining to our general analysis.
2 Competition for Market Shares
Let I = [0, 1] denote a set of agents, where i ∈ I is a particular agent. An agent’s payoff function
has the form
Π(i) = p(i)V (i)− Φ(i), (1)
1In Appendix B.8, we use our approach to explore the inequality effects of firm-driven changes in product
perception, or the distributional impact of an import tax on domestic and foreign firms market shares in interna-
tional trade. Also see Hefti and Lareida (2020) for a stand-alone application in case of competitive advertising,
and Hefti et al. (2020) for the case of a dynamic model.
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where p(i) is the market share of i, V (i) the value earned per unit of market share, and Φ(i)
are expenditures. Each agent can choose an action t(i) ∈ R+ to maximize her payoff. In
general, this action affects each component of (1), together with the joint actions of all agents
as summarized by a quantity T ∈ R+. Further, the payoff function of at least one agent depends
on an exogenous parameter x ∈ X, where X is an open interval in R. Thus, the payoff generally
is a function2
Π(i, t(i), T ;x) = p(i, t(i), T ;x)V (i, t(i), T ;x)− Φ(i, t(i);x). (2)
The way how t(i) and T enter (1) pins down the details of how the agents are engaged in a
competition for market shares. In many (but not all) of our applications, T is the sum of all
chosen actions. That is, if the actions t(i) chosen by each agent i ∈ I are summarized by the
action profile t : I → R+, then T =
∫
I t(i)di. More generally, T is determined by an aggregator
function Z(t) = T for a set of viable action profiles.3 As p(i) are market shares, we impose the




p(i, t(i), T ;x)di = 1. (3)
In words, condition (3) says that the individual market shares add up to one for a given aggregate
T if and only if the action profile t exactly generates T . We call ({Π(i)}i∈I , Z) a competition
for market shares if each Π(i) is of form (2) and Z(·) verifies (3). Many economic models are
competitions for market shares in this sense, as we make explicit in Section 4.
2.1 Equilibrium Market Shares
An equilibrium in ({Π(i)}, Z) is an action profile t and a quantity T , such that for each i ∈ I,
t(i) maximizes (2) given T , and T is endogenously determined by Z(t) = T .
This equilibrium definition encompasses, e.g., monopolistic competition equilibria, Walrasian
equilibria, or equilibria in large aggregative games (see Section 4). Further, it is consistent
with equilibria in the “Global Games” literature (see, e.g., Morris and Shin, 2002). A common
aspect of all these equilibrium definitions is that each agent takes an aggregate T as given when
optimizing her payoff, while T is endogenous to the model. Such a property appears reasonable
with a large number of agents (Alos-Ferrer and Ania, 2005; Acemoglu and Jensen, 2010; Hefti,
2016; Camacho et al., 2018), and it simplifies the formal analysis of the inequality effects that
this paper cares about. In Appendix B.5 we show that our analysis is generally not confined
to this behavioral assumption: Our approach can be adjusted to encompass the case of Nash
equilibria in aggregative games as well.
Competition for Market Shares An equilibrium (t, T ) generates a certain dispersion of
market shares p(·). To systematically study the equilibrium inequality effects caused by a
parameter x, we derive an equivalent characterization of equilibrium, where the agents compete
2Agent index i shows up within the various functions composing Π(·), because these functions could vary
across agents. For example, different agents may be endowed with different cost functions.
3Let T be the set of all functions t : I → R+, i.e., T is the set of all action profiles. A given aggregator
function Z is a mapping Z : TZ → R+ defined on a subset TZ ⊂ T. An action profile is (Z-)viable if t ∈ TZ .
For example, if Z(t) ≡
∫
I
t(i)di, then TZ consists of all (Riemann)-integrable functions t : I → R+.
4
directly in market shares, rather than indirectly choosing them via t(i). This approach delivers
a direct and powerful way of analyzing how x affects the equilibrium market (or payoff) shares.
To be precise, let the market share function p(i, t, T ;x) in (2) be t-bijective for any given
T > 0, x ∈ X and i ∈ I. Then, any chosen action t(i) ∈ R+ has a unique number p(i) ∈ R+
associated with it for given (i, T, x). By a change-of-variable, we rewrite (2) as
Π(i, p(i), T ;x) = p(i)V (i, p(i), T ;x)− Φ(i, p(i), T ;x) (4)
with some (convenient) abuse of notation.4 We now define an equilibrium as a situation, where
each agent i directly chooses her market share p(i) ∈ R+ as to maximize the payoff function
(4), and all market shares must add up to one.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium is a pair (p(·), T ) consisting of a market share
function p : [0, 1]→ R++ and a number T ∈ (0,∞) such that
i) For each i ∈ I, p(i) solves max
p(i)≥0
Π(i), where Π(i) is given by (4).
ii)
∫
I p(i)di = 1
Whenever (p(i), T ) is an equilibrium as in Definition 1, then the unique actions t(i) correspond-
ing to the equilibrium market shares p(i) together with T = Z(t) must be an equilibrium in the
original sense, and vice-versa, as a consequence of the bijective relation between actions and
market shares.5 Further, we restrict attention to interior equilibria, where each agent obtains a
positive equilibrium market share.6
What makes the transformed version of the model convenient in the context of our inequality
analysis is that it will lead to a simple, type-recursive equilibrium equation identifying the
inequality effects caused by x without the need to solve the model for t(i) or T .7
Continuum Agents A final remark concerns the use of “continuum” agents. We show in
Appendix B.3 that continuum agents are without loss of generality in such that, for a given num-
ber of atomistic agents n ∈ N, the “discrete” equilibrium market shares pd(i) can be identified
from the corresponding equilibrium (step-)density function p(i) with support [0, 1] by rescaling
the latter.8 These steps essentially represent the different agent types as specified by the ex
ante agent heterogeneity (see below). One formal advantage of working with a continuum is
that the equilibrium p(·) is a (Lebesgue) density p : [0, 1] → R+ with a fixed support for any
number of agent types, rather than a discrete mapping with variable support depending on the
4If p = p(i, t, T ) then t ≡ p−1(i, p, T ) is the inverse of the function p(i, t, T ) with respect to the variable t.
Hence Π(i, t(i), T ) = Π
(
i, p−1(i, p(i), T ), T
)
≡ Π̂(i, p(i), T ). The abuse of notation is that we continue to use the
notation Π(i, p(i), T ) (instead of Π̂(·)) in the transformed problem (similarly, we use V and Φ instead of V̂ , Φ̂).
5We prove this claim in Appendix B.1.
6This is not too restrictive as we consider a fixed set of agents. It is straightforward to include agent entry or
exit in our approach; see Hefti and Lareida (2020) for an application.
7Because the “direct” and “indirect” approach are equivalent, one can always try to infer how p(i) depends
on x using the indirect approach via t(i). However, this procedure frequently turns out to be less tractable for
our purpose.
8For example, if n = 3 and pd(1) = 1/2, pd(2) = 1/3, pd(3) = 1/6, then p(i) = 3/2, i ∈ [0, 1/3), p(i) = 1,
i ∈ [1/3, 2/3) and p(i) = 1/2, i ∈ [2/3, 1], and
∫
p(i)di = 1/3(3/2 + 1 + 1/2) = 1.
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number of agents.9 Moreover, this formulation includes the case of “true continuum agents”,
which basically means that every agent i is a unique type.
2.2 Regularity Assumptions
Studying the distribution of market shares and related inequality measures is challenging, and
we need to impose certain regularity conditions in order to bring the analytical complexity to
a tractable level. Let g(i, p, T ;x) ≡ ∂∂ppV (i, p, t;x) and ϕ(i, p, T ;x) ≡
∂
∂pΦ(i, p, T ;x), where g(·)
can be interpreted as marginal benefits and ϕ(·) as marginal costs, respectively, pertaining to
an aspired market share p. For given i and T > 0, the FOC from maximizing (4) at an interior
point p(i) > 0 then amounts to the well-known “marginal benefits equal marginal costs”:
g(i, p(i), T ;x) = ϕ(i, p(i), T ;x), (5)
or, in short-hand notation, g(i) = ϕ(i).
Assumption 1 (Regularity) We impose the following technical assumptions:
(A1) For any x ∈ X, T > 0, i ∈ [0, 1] and p ≥ 0: Π(i) is a strongly quasiconcave C2-
function of p, g(i, 0, T ;x) > 0 and g(i, ·, T ;x) is bounded from above, ϕp(i, p, T ;x) > 0,
ϕ(i, 0, T ;x) = Φ(i, 0, T ;x) = 0, and ϕ(i, p, T ;x)
p→∞−→ ∞.
(A2) For any i ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ X: g(i, p, ·;x) and ϕ(i, p, ·;x) are C1-functions, g(i, 1, 0;x) > 0,
g(i, 1, ·;x) is bounded from above, ϕ(i, p, 0;x) = 0, ϕT (i, p, T ;x) > 0 and ϕ(i, p, T ;x)
T→∞−→
∞ if p > 0, and gT (i, p, T ;x) < ϕT (i, p, T ;x) whenever g(i, p, T ;x) = ϕ(i, p, T ;x).
(A3) For any i ∈ [0, 1] and any p, T > 0, g(i, p, T ;x) and ϕ(i, p, T ;x) are C1 in x.
The boundary and slope assumptions (A1) and (A2) jointly assert sufficiency of (5) with respect
to the optimization problem in Definition 1, and the existence of a unique equilibrium which,
for the sake of completeness, we prove in Appendix B.2. Assumption (A3) allows the use of
calculus to study the inequality effects. Note that (A3) includes the case where g(i) or ϕ(i) do
not depend on x.
2.3 Agent Heterogeneity
If different agents have different payoff functions, the market shares will not be uniformly
dispersed. We now make the notion of ex ante agent heterogeneity precise.
Assumption 2 (Order) For any p, T > 0 and any x ∈ X: pV (i, p, T ;x), g(i, p, T ;x) are
(weakly) decreasing and Φ(i, p, T ;x), ϕ(i, p, T ;x) (weakly) increasing in i.
This assumption implies that agents are sorted left-to-right, in thus that agent i never features
lower (marginal) benefits and never higher (marginal) costs than agent j whenever j > i. A
9Nevertheless, our inequality tools apply to the case of finitely many atomistic agents, with the natural
adjustments in the definitions. Specifically, condition
∫
p(i)di = 1 in Defintion 1 is replaced by
∑n
i=1 p(i), and
p(i) is a density with respect to the counting measure.
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simple example is if agents may differ in their ability to compete for an object of identical value
to all agents, such that
Π(i) = p(i)V (p(i), T )− c(i)Φ(p(i), T ), (6)
where c(i) is increasing in i. Taken together, Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that agents with a
lower index i achieve larger market shares and or payoffs.10
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Order) Let (p(·), T ) be an equilibrium for a given x ∈ X, and
consider any two agents with j > i. Then under Assumptions 1 and 2:
i) No “leap-frogging”: p(i) ≥ p(j) and Π(i) ≥ Π(j).
ii) Strict order: p(i) > p(j) if g(i, p, T ) ≥ g(j, p, T ) and ϕ(i, p, T ) ≤ ϕ(j, p, T ) ∀p, T > 0 and
at least one strict inequality, and Π(i) > Π(j) if pV (i, p, T ) ≥ pV (j, p, T ) and Φ(i, p, T ) ≤
Φ(j, p, T ) ∀p, T > 0 and at least one strict inequality.
iii) Equality: p(i) = p(j) if both g(i, p, T ) = g(j, p, T ) and ϕ(i, p, T ) = ϕ(j, p, T ) ∀p, T > 0.
Property i) follows from Assumption 2 and individual optimality: If p(i) < p(j), then the ex
ante stronger agent i could always benefit from deviating to the market level p(j), for which
reason there can be no such deviations in equilibrium. The other claims have similar reasons.
2.3.1 Agent Types
By ii) and iii) of Proposition 1, the equilibrium market share function reflects the order struc-
ture imposed by the ex ante agent heterogeneity. In the following, we consider the two order
structures we deem most relevant: The case of finitely many different agent types as well as the
case of a proper continuum of agent types. To clarify, consider example (6) and suppose that
c(·) > 0 belongs to one of the following two classes:
• Class I :⇔ All increasing, right-continuous step functions for which ∃i0 ∈ (0, 1): i < i0 ≤ j
⇒ c(i) < c(j), i, j ∈ [0, 1].
• Class II :⇔ All strictly increasing functions c ∈ C1 ([0, 1], [1, c̄]).
It is evident from ii) and iii) in Proposition 1 that the equilibrium density p(·) must reflect the
order structure of the respective class. E.g., if c(·)belongs to Class I, then p(·) must be a right-
continuous step function in equilibrium; see Figure 1 for an illustration. Such cost functions
matter, because they are the continuum analogue to the case of finitely many different cost
types (see Appendix B.3); the different steps of c(·) represent the different types.11 Likewise,
p(·) is a density with p′(i) < 0 on (0, 1) if c(·) is Class II. Note that both classes exclude, by
their definitions, the case where all agents have the same value of c(i), in which case all agents
were perfect clones.
10Assumption 2 is stronger than what we actually require. We only need that the equilibrium order of the
market shares is not pivoted by the parameter x, i.e., if p(i;x) ≥ p(j;x) then also p(i;x′) ≥ p(j;x′) ∀x′ ∈ X and
any i, j. Then, ordering the agents left-to-right is without loss of generality.
11Specifically, as Figure 1 shows, if c(·) is Class I, i.e., a step function capturing agent cost types k = 1, ...,K
with measures γ1, ..., γK > 0,
∑
k γk = 1, then p(·) must be a corresponding step-wise decreasing density, meaning
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Figure 1: Costs and market share functions for K = 3 (Class I)
It is straightforward to extend the logic of the above example to other forms of ex ante agent
heterogeneity.12 Whenever the agents differ such that there are finitely many different payoff
functions, the equilibrium density p(·) must be a downward-stepping density as in Figure 1
under Assumptions 1 and 2, where the steps of p(·) amount to the different ex ante agent types.
In what follows, we shall assume the ex ante agent heterogeneity to be such that the equilibrium
p(·) is either a step function or a strictly decreasing C1-function of i.
Definition 2 Let p : [0, 1]→ R++ be a density function. Then
• p(·) belongs to Class I if p(·) is a step-wise decreasing, right-continuous with at least one
and at most finitely many downward steps.
• p(·) belongs to Class II if p(i) is a C1-function with p′(i) < 0 for i ∈ [0, 1].
Note that if p(·) belongs either to Class I or II, then p(·) must display the “somewhere strictly
decreasing” (SSD) property: ∃i0 ∈ (0, 1): p(i) > p(j) for i < i0 ≤ j. Further, the CDF
associated with p(·) must be increasing, concave and strictly above the diagonal for i ∈ (0, 1) if
p is of Class I or II (see Appendix B.4.3).
Let p(·) be an equilibrium density. Then [i] ≡ {s ∈ [0, 1] : p(s) = p(i)} is the equivalence class
of agents with representative i ∈ I. By Proposition 1, the agents within a given equivalence
class are endowed with identical payoff functions. In this sense we think of i as the type of all
agents in [i]:
Definition 3 (Agent Type) Let p : [0, 1] → R++ be a decreasing density, and for any i ∈
[0, 1] let [i] ≡ {s ∈ [0, 1] : p(s) = p(i)}. Then, the collection of these equivalence classes on [0, 1]
corresponds to the set of agent types, and all agents in a given equivalence class have the same
type. Further, we define a transitive relation B by j B i :⇐⇒ j > i and j /∈ [i].
The relation B allows for an easy reference in terms of different agent types. If p(·) is Class I,
j B i means that j is of a “weaker” type than i, i.e., j sits on a lower step of p(·) than i. If p(·)
is of Class II, the relations “B” and “>” coincide.
12For example, it immediately follows that whenever the agent heterogeneity is such that I = [0, 1] can be
partitioned by a finite number of intervals I1, ..., In of n > 1 distinct agent groups consisting of homogeneous
members, such that g(i, p, T ) ≥ g(j, p, T ) and ϕ(i, p, T ) ≤ ϕ(j, p, T ), one inequality strict, whenever j > i, i ∈ In
but j /∈ In, then p(·) must be a step-wise decreasing density with finitely many steps, where p(i) = p(j) iff
i, j ∈ In.
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3 Inequality Effects
We say that the parameter x induces inequality effects if the equilibrium market share function
p(·) depends on x.
Definition 4 (Inequality Effects) Given a competition for market shares ({Π(i)}, Z), the
parameter x induces inequality effects if ∃x, x′ ∈ X: p(·;x) 6= p(·;x′) for the respective equilib-
rium market share functions. If p(·;x) = p(·;x′) ∀x ∈ X, then x is inequality preserving.
With respect to the possible inequality effects, we focus on those that affect the equilibrium
p(·;x) in a way that preserves the agent order. To state this formally, let p(·;x) denote the
equilibrium market share function for any x ∈ X. For each i and any x ∈ X, let [i]x ≡
{s ∈ [0, 1] : p(s) = p(i)} be the set of i-equivalent agent types in equilibrium, such that
Tx ≡ {[i]x : i ∈ [0, 1]} is the equilibrium set of agent types for a particular x. Note that under
Assumptions 1-2, a unique equilibrium market share function p(·;x) exists ∀x ∈ X, such that
the assignment x 7→ Tx is well-defined. Our notion of an order-preserving market condition
means that this assignment is constant.
Assumption 3 (Order-Preserving Market Conditions) x is an order-preserving market
condition if Tx = Tx′, ∀x, x′ ∈ X, such that all x ∈ X generate the same set of types in
equilibrium, and p(·;x) is weakly decreasing ∀x ∈ X.
If x is an order-preserving market condition, then the agent ordering as reflected by the equi-
librium market share function p(·) is unaffected by x. That is, if agent i obtains a larger
equilibrium market share than j for x, then the same holds for any other x′ ∈ X.13 Note that
the definition of an order-preserving market condition does not exclude that x could affect only
a single agent, i.e., is an idiosyncratic rather than a common condition.14 We only require that
changes in x cannot induce a leap-frogging of one or several agents. This can always be assured,
e.g., if p(·) is Class I and the changes in x remain sufficiently small.
We are particularly interested in the case where x is a common market condition, meaning
that x affects marginal benefits or marginal costs of each agent in a qualitatively similar manner,
while respecting the agent order.
Definition 5 (Common Market Condition) An order-preserving market condition x is a
common market condition if for any given p, T > 0 g(i, p, T ;x) and ϕ(i, p, T ;x) either increase,
decrease or are constant in x for all agents.
As an example, suppose that an increase in x increases marginal benefits for each agent, i.e.,
gx(i) > 0 ∀i, implying that all agents aspire a larger market share. This effect, however, can
be differentially strong for various agents, making it generally an open and non-trivial question
how the market or payoff share distributions settle down in the new equilibrium.
13If p(·;x) is Class I, this means that p(·;x′) remains a Class I density ∀x′ ∈ X, where the length of each step
is invariant to x′ (capturing that agent types remain the same) and the steps go down for any given x.
14For example, if gx(i) 6= 0 or ϕx(i) 6= 0, while gx(j) = ϕx(j) = 0 ∀j 6= i this amount to a purely idiosyncratic
condition, where only agent i is directly affected by (a change) in x.
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Structure of Section 3 In Section 3.1 we derive a single type-recursive equation from the
optimality condition (5) which is the basis of our inequality analysis. This equation can be
decomposed into a direct-aggregative and an indirect effect of dx. The former effect alone is
decisive for whether inequality effects arise for any conceivable marginal change dx that affects
one, many or all agents (Theorem 1). We exemplify the direct-aggregative effects if x is a “level
variable”, which is a relevant concept for many of our later applications.
In Section 3.2 we focus on rotations of the market share function as a specific type of in-
equality effect, and prove that, again, the direct-aggregative effect alone determines whether
the inequality effects take on the form of a rotation (Theorem 2). The indirect effect determines
additional properties of rotations (Proposition 2), such as whether x has a monotonic effect
on inequality (Theorem 4). The latter is likely to occur if marginal costs and benefits can be
represented as power functions (Proposition 3).
Finally, we present a procedure for determining the comparative-statics of the aggregate T
based on our formulation as a competition for market shares. Knowing sign T ′(x) turns out to
be relevant for some of our inequality theorems.
Throughout the rest of Section 3, we take Assumptions 1-3 as satisfied, and suppose that the
ex ante heterogeneity is such that p(·) belongs to Class I or II.
3.1 Existence of inequality effects
Let x0 ∈ X. As (5) holds ∀i in equilibrium, it follows that equilibrium forces equate the ratio
of marginal benefit over marginal costs for any two agents. Hence
g(i, p(i), T ;x0)
ϕ(i, p(i), T );x0)
=
g(j, p(j), T ;x0)
ϕ(j, p(j), T );x0)
i, j ∈ [0, 1], (7)
or, in short-hand, g(i)/ϕ(i) = g(j)/ϕ(j). We exploit (7) to obtain a simple, type-recursive














Thus, ∆i is the percentage change in equilibrium market share of agent i, and i gains market
share if and only if ∆i > 0. Further, εi, ηi are the elasticity of marginal benefits g(·) and costs
ϕ(·), respectively, with respect to p.
Lemma 1 Let j B i, and consider a marginal change dx > 0. Then ηi > 0, εi < ηi, and























The type-recursive equation (9) decomposes the relation between ∆i and ∆j into a direct-
aggregative effect (Rij), and an indirect effect (kij). To understand these names, note that Rij
10
depends directly on x via gx(s) and via the aggregate quantity T
′(x). By contrast, kij collects
the indirect effects that dx has on g(·) and ϕ(·) via the changes in p(i). We shall often write R
and k if there is no confusion about types.
Decomposition (9) is key for analyzing if and how x affects p(i). The first theorem shows that
inequality effects exist if and only if the direct-aggregative effect Rij is non-zero for at least two
different agent types.
Theorem 1 (Existence of inequality effects) If Rij = 0 ∀i, j ∈ [0, 1] and any x ∈ X, then
x is inequality preserving. Conversely, if for a given x ∈ X ∃i, j ∈ [0, 1] such that Rij 6= 0,
then inequality effects arise. Specifically, ∃δ > 0 such that p(·;x′) 6= p(·;x) for any x′ ∈
(x− δ, x+ δ)\{x}.
Theorem 1 characterizes the existence of inequality effects independent of whether dx affects all
or only some agents. By Theorem 1, the indirect effect kij plays no role for whether inequality
effects arise, which is fairly intuitive. The indirect effect captures how sensitive g(·), ϕ(·) respond
to changes in p, and as such may influence certain quantitative aspects should inequality effects
occur, but not whether they arise in the first place.
By Theorem 1, x is inequality preserving if and only if A(·) is invariant to the agent index i
∀x ∈ X. If x affects the agents in a differential way, e.g., by entering the payoffs of some but
not all agents, then inequality effects most likely arise. By contrast, one could expect x to be
inequality preserving if x affects all agents in a similar manner. This leads us to the notion of
a level variable.
3.1.1 Level Variables
Suppose, for simplicity, that x affects only g(i), the RHS of (5), for each agent.15 We then say
that x is a level variable if x affects g(i) by the same proportion for all agents.
Definition 6 (Level Variable) A common market condition x is a level variable if gx(i)g(i) and
gT (i)
g(i) in (5) are independent from i and p(i) ∀x ∈ X, ∀T > 0.
Note that the definition of a level variable includes both the direct and the aggregative effect
caused by a change of x.16 Further, x is a level variable if and only if g(i) is multiplicative
separable in (i, p) and (T, x).17 A special case occurs if marginal benefits are identical for all
agents, i.e., g(i, pi, T ;x) = V (T ;x), such that (5) becomes
V (T ;x) = ϕ(i, p(i), T ). (11)
This amounts to the case of a symmetrical competition, in thus that the benefit per unit of
market share, V (T, x), is identical for all agents.






g(j) cancel ∀i, j and all x ∈ X
if and only if x is a level variable. Thus, with level variables, the inequality effects essentially
15It is straightforward to adjust Definition 6 if x enters ϕ(i) instead.
16Formally, we have that ∂g(i)
∂x
= gx(i) + gT (i)T
′(x).
17A function f(i, p, T, x) is multiplicatively separable in (i, p) and (T, x) if f(i, p, T, x) = u(i, p)v(T, x). Note
that multiplicative separability includes the trivial case where f(i, p, T, x) does not depend, e.g., on T at all.
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boil down to how the aggregate T affects marginal costs for the different agents. The following
result makes this explicit.
Corollary 1 The level variable x is inequality preserving if ϕ(i) in (5) is multiplicatively sep-
arable in (i, p) and T . Conversely, if x is inequality preserving and T ′(x) 6= 0 ∀x ∈ X, then
marginal costs must be multiplicatively separable in (i, p) and T .
This result is intuitive. For if ϕ(i) is multiplicatively separable in (i, p) and T , then marginal
costs are affected by the same proportion ∀i by a change of T . This counterbalances that
marginal benefits change in proportion, resulting in a stable market share distribution.
If the market share is of the form p(i) = t(i)/T , such that t(i) = p(i)T , we can say more
about whether a level variable induces inequality effects.
Corollary 2 Let p(i) = t(i)/T . A level variable is inequality preserving if Φ(i, t) = c(i)tγ. If
T ′(x) 6= 0 ∀x ∈ X and the level variable is inequality preserving, then Φ(i, t) = c(i)tγ.
Under the respective requirements, Corollary 2 shows that it is necessary and sufficient for a level
variable to be inequality preserving that costs are power functions with an identical exponent.
This points to a decisive role of power functions, and one that we shall explore further in the
next sections.
The requirement that T ′(x) 6= 0 in Corollaries 1-2 is weak and satisfied in all our applications.
By Corollary 1 it therefore depends exclusively on ϕ(i) whether inequality effects arise or not
in case of level variables. In Appendix B.4.2 we pursue the opposite reasoning, and study the
inequality effects that can arise due to a change in a common market condition given that ϕ is
of the separable form ϕ(i) = c(i, p(i))C(T ).
3.2 Rotations
Given that x induces inequality effects, can more be said about their properties? The following
section provides an affirmative answer by considering the possibility that x induces a rotation
of p(·).
Definition 7 (Rotations) Let x, x′ ∈ X and p(·, x), p(·, x′) be two decreasing densities with
support [0, 1]. We say that p(·;x′) is an outward-rotation (OR) of p(·;x), or p(·;x) is an
inward-rotation (IR) of p(·;x′), if ∃ 0 < i0 ≤ i1 < 1 such that
p(i;x′) > p(i;x) i ∈ [0, i0)
p(i;x′) < p(i;x) i ∈ (i1, 1)
p(i;x′) = p(i;x) i ∈ (i0, i1]
(12)
where the last condition only applies if i0 < i1. We say that a parameter change dx > 0 induces
an OR (IR) of p(·;x) if ∃δ > 0 such that p(·;x′) is OR (IR) of p(·;x) for any x′ ∈ (x, x+ δ).
The defining property of a rotation is that there is a “turning point”, where the market shares





Red is monotonic OR of black
0 1
𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖)
Red is OR of black
0 1
𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖)
Red is not a rotation of black
Figure 2: Class I rotations: Examples and counterexample
Lorenz Dominance If p(·, x′) is an OR (IR) of p(·, x), then the dispersion of market shares
has become less (more) equal. This is related to the Lorenz curve, which is a common tool in
inequality analysis. A distribution Lorenz dominates another distribution if its Lorenz curve
lies below the Lorenz curve of the other. Many standard inequality measures, such as the Gini
coefficient or the notion of first-order stochastic dominance, are consistent with the partial order
generated by Lorenz dominance (Atkinson, 1970). The rotation-order ranks two market share
functions according to first-order stochastic dominance (see Appendix B.4.3). Thus, if p(·;x′) is
an OR (IR) of p(·;x), then the former Lorenz dominates (is Lorenz dominated by) the latter. It
follows that p(·;x′) features less (more) equality than p(·;x) according to any Lorenz-consistent
inequality measure.
3.2.1 Existence of Rotations
The following theorem shows that the direct-aggregative effect R alone is decisive for whether
a rotation arises.
Definition 8 R is uniformly positive (negative) at x0 ∈ X, if Rij(x0) > (<)0 ∀j B i. If R is
uniformly positive (negative) ∀x ∈ X, then R is globally uniformly positive (negative).
Theorem 2 (Rotational Effects) If p(·) belongs to Class I and R is uniformly positive (neg-
ative) at x0 ∈ X, then dx > 0 always induces an OR (IR) of p(·, x0). If p(·) belongs to Class
I or II and R is globally uniformly positive (negative), then the market shares of the strongest
types i ∈ [0] increase (decrease) strictly in x, while the ones of the weakest types i ∈ [1] strictly
decrease (increase).
To understand the first result, note that A(i) captures how sensitively marginal costs and
benefits respond to x and T , which amount an agent’s incentives to adjust her market share.
If A(i) > A(j), j B i, such that Rij > 0, then stronger types face stronger incentives to aspire
a larger market share (or weaker incentives to reduce their market shares). This intuitively
implies that whenever type i manages to increase her equilibrium market share, this holds for
any stronger type as well. Because not all market shares can increase, the resulting inequality
effect takes on the form of a rotation.
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The second result shows that the tails of the distribution evolve monotonically in x under
the respective conditions. A corollary to this result is that the inequality effects in the two- or
three-types cases are fully characterized.18
Theorems 1 and 2 show that the local behavior of the equilibrium function (5) is highly informa-
tive about the global properties of the equilibrium distribution p(·). The uniformity requirement
on R is met by all our applications in Section 4 (if R 6= 0), and thus appears not to be restric-
tive in the context of common market conditions. More generally, one could seek to identify
structural conditions assuring that R > (<)0 uniformly. We pursue this next in case of level
variables, and in Appendix B.4 for the case of multiplicative separable cost functions.
Level Variables We now evaluate Theorem 2 if x is a level variable and p(·) is Class I. Then,
signR is only determined by the properties of the marginal costs ϕ(i). Moreover, by using the
elasticity function
θ(i) ≡ ϕT (i)T
ϕ(i)
(13)
condition (10) yields that signRij = sign (θ(j)− θ(i))T ′(x). This shows that the elasticity of
marginal costs ϕ(i) provide a sufficient criterion for a level variable to induce a rotation.
Corollary 3 Let x be a level variable and T ′(x) > 0. If θ(i) < (>)θ(j) ∀jB i, then Rij > (<)0
and x induces an OR (IR) of p(·).
Corollary 3 equally applies for T ′(x) < 0 if “OR” and “IR” are interchanged. Further, if
θ(i) = θ(j) ∀i, j, then ϕ(i) must be multiplicatively separable in (i, p) and T , meaning that x
is inequality preserving (see Corollary 3).
The intuition in case of an OR is as follows. Let j B i, such that agent j currently has a
smaller market share than agent i, reflecting an ex ante advantage of agent i. An increase in a
level variable induces the same incentive for all agents to expand their market shares, which is
associated with higher expenses. If θ(i) < θ(j), the marginal costs of the agent with the larger
market share increases at a slower pace, meaning that this agent can adjust better to the new
situation than its competitors with lower market shares. If such a ranking applies for any two
different agent types, the agents with the largest market shares are affected least in terms of
costs, explaining why an OR results.
If p(i) = t(i)/T , the elasticity condition in Corollary 3 can be stated directly in terms of the
elasticity of the marginal cost function Φt(i, t) ≡ h(i, t). Let
ψ(i) ≡ ht(i, t)t
h(i, t)
(14)
denote the t-elasticity of marginal costs h(i, t). It then is easy to check that θ(i) = ψ(i) + 1,
and thus:
18This follows because in the two-types case R01 ≥ (>)0 iff R10 ≤ (<)0, meaning that R is either uniformly
positive (negative) or R = 0. Moreover, in the three-types case it follows from (the proof of) Theorem 2 that if R
is globally uniformly positive (or negative), then any x > x0 induces an OR (IR) of p(·, x0), because the behavior
of the “middle group” does not matter.
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Corollary 4 Let p(i) = t(i)/T , and x be a level variable with T ′(x) > 0. If ψ(i) < (>)ψ(j)
∀j B i, then x induces an OR (IR) of p(·).
3.2.2 Monotonic Rotations
Theorem 2 is useful for detecting rotations. However, a rotation is a fairly general type of
inequality effect that is consistent with various patterns of the “middling” agents. For example,
an OR can be consistent with some winning agents “catching up” with even stronger types. This
is illustrated in Figure 2 (left panel), where among the winning agents the second strongest
agents gain more market share than the strongest, such that the gap between these agents
narrows. By contrast, the gap between both the winning and the losing agents widens in the
rotation of the middle panel in Figure 2. The following definition makes the notion of a rotation
featuring such “increasing gaps” precise.
Definition 9 (Monotonic Rotations) Suppose that∞ > p(·;x′), p(·;x) > 0 are right-continuous,






whenever j B i ∈ (0, 1) (15)
is satisfied, then p(·;x′) is a monotonic OR (IR) of p(·;x).
The fact that condition (15) actually induces a rotation is proved in Appendix B.4.1.19 Also
note that Definition 9 applies to Class I and II market share functions.20 In case of a mono-
tonic rotation, the ratio of market shares is either increasing or decreasing as x changes. This
equivalently means that if p(i;x′) is a monotonic OR (IR) of p(i;x), then the relative change in
market shares is strictly increasing (decreasing) in agent type, such that the strongest agents
(i ∈ i[0]) gain (lose) most while the weakest agents (i ∈ i[1]) lose (gain) most. Thus, a “catching
up” as in Figure 2 (left panel) is impossible. This follows from the following fact.




v > 1, then also
u′ − v′ > u− v.
If p(·;x′) is a monotonic OR of p(·;x) and i, j are two different agents types both featuring higher
market shares in the new equilibrium, then the absolute gap between these market shares must
have widened.
If (15) holds ∀x ∈ X, then p(·;x′) is a monotonic OR (or IR) of p(·;x) for any x′ > x.21 Then,
the rotations induced by dx > 0 are transitive: If p(·;x′′) is a monotonic OR of p(·;x′) and p(·;x′)
is a monotonic OR of p(·;x), then p(·;x′′) must be a monotonic OR of p(·;x), too (similarly for
19In general, Condition (15) is sufficient for a rotation to occur unless in the case of just two agent types, where
(15), the rotation-property and stochastic dominance of the respective distribution functions are equivalent, which
we prove in Appendix B.4.
20In the special case where p(·) is a Class II density and (15) holds for any j > i, (15) is known as the
monotone likelihood property in mathematical statistics and econometrics (see, e.g., Casella and Berger (2002)).
In economic theory, monotone likelihood ratios are sometimes imposed by mechanism design or contract theory
as exogenous assumptions on the ex ante type distribution for reasons entirely unrelated to this article.
21If p(·;x) is Class II and condition (15) holds on X, this is equivalent to strict log-super(sub)modularity of
p(i;x), but not if p(·;x) is of Class I given that p(·) is a step function; Appendix B.4 discusses these claims in
greater detail.
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IR). Thus, the relative market share p(i;x)p(j;x) , j B i, is strictly increasing (decreasing) in x with a
monotonic OR (IR), meaning that market shares must be less and less equally (more and more
equally) dispersed as x increases. That is, the inequality of p(·;x) must increase (decrease) over
the entire parameter space X as measured by any Lorenz-consistent inequality measure.
3.2.3 Detecting Monotonic Rotations
The aim of this section is to connect property (15) defining a monotonic rotation to some of
our more primitive notions. The first result relates (15) to the ∆i-formulation in (8) which we
used earlier to identify inequality effects.
Theorem 3 (Monotonic Rotations) Let p(·) be a Class I or II density, and x0, x ∈ X. If
∆i(x) > ∆j(x) ∀x ≥ x0 and any j B i. (16)
then p(i;x) is a monotonic OR of p(i;x0) for any x > x0. If the first inequality in (16) is
reversed, then p(i;x) is a monotonic IR of p(i;x0) for any x > x0.







> 0 ∀x ≥ x0 and any j B i. (16’)
Theorem 3 is useful in applications, because it says that whenever we can infer condition (16’)
from the equilibrium equation (7), we may conclude that p(·;x) is a monotonic OR (or IR) of
p(·;x0) for any x > x0, even if we cannot solve the equilibrium equation explicitely.22 If (16)
or (16’) holds with equality instead of “>” ∀x, then x is inequality preserving, which yields a
useful alternative test for the existence of inequality effects.
Corollary 5 Let p(·;x) be a density function with support [0, 1] that is differentiable on X.





= 0 ∀i, j ∈ I and ∀x ∈ X.
In our previous results, we traced the existence of inequality effects and rotations back to the
direct-aggregative effect R. We next show that it depends on the indirect effect k whether a
monotonic rotation results from a change of x.
We say that k(x0) is uniformly larger (smaller) than one at x0 if kij(x0) ≥ (≤)1 ∀j B i.
The following proposition shows that if R is uniformly positive or negative, and k is uniformly
larger or smaller than one, the resulting rotation must display a certain quantitative pattern.
In particular, the market shares of either the winners or losers must evolve monotonically,
depending on which of the four possible cases arises.
Proposition 2 (Partially Monotonic Rotations) Let p(·;x) be Class I, and suppose that
R is uniformly positive (negative) at x0 ∈ X. If k(x0) is uniformly larger than one, there is
δ > 0 such that






∀j B i (17)
22In Appendix B.4 we derive an alternative rotation condition that operates over differences.
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for any x′ ∈ (x0, x0 + δ). If k is uniformly smaller than one, there is δ > 0 such that






∀j B i (18)
for any x′ ∈ (x0, x0 + δ).
In view of Definition 7, the conditions in Proposition 2 amount to partially monotonic rotations.
If R is uniformly positive, such that an OR results (Theorem 2), and k is uniformly larger than
one, (17) says that among winning agents, the stronger an agent is (lower index i), the more
the agent gains in relative terms. Equivalently, if agent i gains market share as dx > 0 and
j B i, then the relative market share p(i;x)p(j;x) must have strictly increased. By contrast, if k ≤ 1
uniformly, then (18) says that among the losing agents, the weaker an agent is the more she
loses. The same logic applies “from the other side” if R < 0 uniformly, such that an IR results,
and hence the weaker agents gain market shares while the stronger agents lose.
If k is uniformly equal to one, both statements of Proposition 2 apply. The consequence,
summarized by Theorem 4, is that then x must induce a monotonic rotation.
Theorem 4 (Monotonic rotations) Let p(·) be a Class I or II density. If k(x) = 1 ∀i, j ∈
[0, 1] and any x ∈ X, and R is globally uniformly positive (negative), then p(i;x) is a monotonic
OR (IR) of p(i;x0) for any x > x0 ∈ X.
Intuitively, k = 1 means that the marginal costs and benefits of all agents respond equally
sensitive, ceteris paribus, to changes in their aspired market shares. Theorem 4 shows that
in this case the mere uniform positivity of the direct-aggregative effect suffices to assure the
existence of a monotonic rotation.
Level Variables If x is a level variable, p(i) = t(i)/T , and g(i) is multiplicatively separable
in i, p and (T, x), we can express Proposition 2 in terms of cost elasticities (14). The reason is
that in this case the indirect effect kij is entirely determined by ψ(i) and ψ(j).
23
Corollary 6 Let p(i) = t(i)/T , and x be a level variable with T ′(x) > 0. If ψ(j) > (<)ψ(i)
∀j B i, then R is uniformly positive (negative) and k is uniformly larger (smaller) than one,
such that a partially monotonic OR (IR) with property (17) ( (18)) results.
In terms of applications, Corollary 6 will be useful because it includes (11) as a special case.
3.2.4 Power Functions
The previous section shows that the indirect effect k is decisive for whether a rotation is mono-
tonic or not. The main result of this section shows that if g(·) and ϕ(·) in (5) can be written as
general power functions, then k = 1 uniformly and, accordingly, the rotations are monotonic.
Proposition 3 If g(·) and ϕ(·) in (5) are power functions of the form
g(i, p, T ;x) = ĝ(i, T ;x)pξ(T ;x), ϕ(i, p, T ) = ϕ̂(i, T )pζ(T ), (19)
23Multiplicative separability implies that ε(i) = ε(j) in (8), and kij = η(j)/η(i) = ψ(j)/ψ(i).
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where ξ(T ;x), ζ(T ) are real-valued functions, then k(x) = 1 uniformly ∀x ∈ X. Thus, if R is
globally uniformly positive (negative), then p(·;x′) is a monotonic OR (IR) of p(·;x) ∀x′ > x.
Because the power function property is preserved under differentiation, (19) holds if costs and
benefits in the payoff function Π(·) are power functions. Note that the conditions in (19) include
the special cases where, e.g., g(·) does not depend on p at all (ξ(T ;x) = 0), or where ϕ(i, p, T ) is
linear in p. As we shall see in Section 4, many important examples in economics involve power
functions and, by Theorem 4, can therefore are subject to strong inequality effects.
Some of our previous results on rotations were centered around how the ratio p(i;x)/p(j;x)
depends on x, ceteris paribus. These results are particularly convenient in case of power func-












and Theorem 3 tells us that x induces a monotonic rotation whenever the RHS of (20) is strictly
increasing in x ∀j B i in equilibrium.
Level Variables If p(i) = t(i)/T and costs are power functions Φ(i, t) = c(i)tγi , where γi > 0
is constant for each i, then a stronger version of Corollary 4 results. In particular, given that x
is a level variable, the power function property (19) assures that g(i) must be multiplicatively
separable in i, p and (T, x), which implies that the rotations must be monotonic.
Corollary 7 Let p(i) = t(i)/T , Φ(i, t) = c(i)tγ(i), and x be a level variable with T ′(x) > 0.
If γi < (>)γj ∀j B i, then x induces a monotonic OR (IR) of p(·). If γi = γ ∀i, j, then x is
inequality preserving.
3.2.5 Payoff Inequality
Up to now, our inequality analysis centered on the dispersion of market shares. We now consider
inequality effects in the dispersion of payoff shares, and study the relation between market and
payoff shares.
Let s(i) ≡ Π(i)/
∫
I Π(s)ds denote the payoff share earned by agent i. A fairly natural questions
to ask is whether payoff shares s(·) are likely to evolve similarly to market shares p(·). The
general relation between p(·) and s(·) is subtle, and one cannot infer the inequality effects of
s(·) from those of p(·), and vice-versa, without imposing more structure on Π(i).
Things tie up if costs and benefits are power functions as in Section 3.2.4. Let
Π(i) = p(i)αĝ(i, T ;x)− p(i)βϕ̂(i, T ), (21)
where, in general, α ≡ u(T ;x) and β ≡ z(T ) with β > α > 0, such that the first-order conditions
have the form (19), and (20) applies.24 Because s(·), like p(·), is a density with support [0, 1],
Corollary 5 implies that dx induces inequality effects on s(·) if and only if the ratio s(i)/s(j) is
24The requirement that β > α follows from strong quasiconcavity.
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Thus, relative payoff shares (22) display a similar structure as relative market shares (20). If
α, β are constant, the market and payoff shares essentially follow the same inequality patterns.
Proposition 4 Suppose that s(i)s(j) is given by (22), where β > α > 0 are constant. If either ĝ(·)
or ϕ̂(·) is invariant to the agent index i, then
i) x is inequality preserving in s(·) ⇔ x inequality preserving in p(·),
ii) dx induces a monotonic OR (IR) of s(·) ⇔ dx induces a monotonic OR (IR) of p(·).
If both ratios on the RHS of (22) are strictly increasing (decreasing) in x, then dx > 0 induces
a monotonic OR (IR) of both p(·) and s(·).
By Proposition 4, s(·) and p(·) can display dissimilar patterns only if both ratios on the RHS of
(22) depend on x, but one ratio increases in x while the other decreases. In terms of our later
applications, we often find that the ratio of marginal benefits, ĝ(i)/ĝ(j), is independent of x,
implying that p(·) and s(·) ought to display the same inequality pattern.
Although p(·) and s(·) may behave similarly, this does not generally imply that these distribu-
tions coincide. However, as (22) suggest, the relation between the two can be disentangled if
payoffs are of the form (21).








p(j) ∀j B i, then s(·) is a monotonic OR (IR) of p(·).
To avoid misunderstanding, the statement that “s(·) is an OR of p(·)” means that the two
densities s(·) and p(·) are ranked by the OR criterion analogously to Definition 7. That is, s(·)
crosses p(·) from above. Note that Lemma 3 can be used to rank any two decreasing densities
with identical equivalence classes and support according to the OR-criterion.
3.3 Comparative-Statics of T (x)
By (10), sign T ′(x) matters for R, and can affect the rotational pattern. We now present a
simple procedure to determine sign T ′(x), exploiting the transformation of the model into a
competition for market shares. The procedure works as follows.
• Step I: Fix an arbitrary agent i, and suppose that x and T are exogenous parameters.
Then, equation (5) implicitly determines a function p(i;T, x). Use the Implicit Function
Theorem to determine the partial derivatives px(i;T, x) and pT (i;T, x).
• Step II: Define G(T, x) ≡
∫
p(i;T, x)di. Use Step I to determine GT (T, x) and Gx(T, x).
Use the equilibrium equation G(T, x) = 1 to determine T ′(x).
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We illustrate this procedure by proving the following result.
Lemma 4 Let Assumptions 1-2 be satisfied, gx(i) > 0 and ϕx(i) = 0 ∀i. Then T ′(x) > 0.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary agent i. Step I: By (A1), equation (5) must have a unique
solution p(i;T, x) for any given T, x. Quasiconcavity (A1) and gx > 0 further imply that
px(i;T, x) > 0. Likewise, quasiconcavity and the fact that gT (i) < ϕT (i) by (A2), together
assure that pT (i;T, x) < 0. Step II: For G(T, x) ≡
∫
p(i;T, x)di it follows from Step I that
Gx(T, x) > 0 and GT (T, x) < 0. Based on the equilibrium equation G(T, x) = 1, the Implicit
Function Theorem and Step II implies that T ′(x) > 0.
In the literature on aggregative games the comparative-statics of aggregate quantities is a promi-
nent questions. This literature has found creative ways to establish monotone comparative-
statics of aggregate quantities (see, e.g., Corchon, 1994; Cornes and Hartley, 2012; Acemoglu
and Jensen, 2010, 2013; Camacho et al., 2018). We complement this particular aspect by offer-
ing a simple procedure to determine sign T ′(x) by exploiting the equivalent representation of
the model as a competition for market shares. Our main contribution, however, is to exploit
the aggregative structure to study the array of inequality effects across all agents.
More generally, one should note that any monotonicity of the action variable in the pa-
rameters, as commonly studied by the literature on monotone comparative statics, is of little
relevance to our inequality analysis. The mere fact that, e.g., actions or payoffs are increasing
in x does not generally pin down the inequality effects.25
4 Applications
We now analyze the inequality effects in a variety of examples, thereby pursuing a two-folded
goal. First, we want to facilitate the understanding and demonstrate the applicability of our
inequality results by putting them to work in various competition models.26 Second, we seek
to extend the set of testable predictions regarding market inequality within the competition
models we consider.
Procedural Remark We study the inequality effects in the various applications by essentially
following the analytical procedure outlined in Section 3. That is: We first rewrite the payoff
function, such that a competition for market share results. We then assert whether the market
condition x is a level variable. If yes, this may allow us to directly use some of our general
inequality results about level variables. If not, we proceed by deriving the sign of the direct-
aggregative effect R based on (5) which, by Theorems 1 and 2, allows us to determine whether
an inequality effect arises and, if yes, whether it adopts the pattern of a rotation. Alternatively,
we can try to use Theorem 3 or Theorem 4 to detect monotonic rotations, which is particularly
helpful if payoffs involve power functions.
25Our approach does not depend on any monotonic relations between parameters and equilibrium actions.
26In Appendix B.8 we also study an extensive application to international trade in a discrete choice setting.
Also see Hefti and Lareida (2020) for a stand-alone application where we extend the framework to allow for agent
entry.
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4.1 Inequality Effects in Monopolistic Competition
Our first application studies firm-side market inequality in models of monopolistic competition
with CES-demand (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). This type of competition plays a central role, e.g.,
in international trade or IO. Specifically, we study how changes in total disposable consumer
income, the industry-level of productive efficiency or the intensity of competition as captured
by the consumers’ “love-of-variety” influence the equilibrium distribution of firm-side market
shares and payoffs under a variety of assumptions on the production functions.
Some of our results connect to international trade. It is well-known that firm heterogeneity
is indispensable for understanding many empirical regularities in trade data related to firm-side
market inequality (Redding, 2011; Gervais, 2015). However, the question how the firm market or
payoff shares depend on common market conditions, such as an increasing consumer income due
to international integration (Mrázová and Neary, 2017), has generally received little attention.
In this respect, our framework allows for a level of generality in the inequality analysis that
goes beyond the standard case of constant marginal costs on the producer side.
4.1.1 The Model





σds, ι ∈ [0, 1], (23)
where s ∈ [0, 1] denotes a differentiated product supplied by a single firm.27 Further, rs > 0
measures the importance of product s to consumers (e.g., the quality), qs(ι) ≥ 0 is the respective
quantity demanded by ι, and σ ∈ (0, 1) the elasticity of substitution. Consumer ι has disposable
income I(ι) > 0, and chooses each qs(ι) to maximize (23), subject to the budget constraint∫
Psqs(ι)ds = I(ι), where Ps > 0 is the price of product s. For η ≡ 11−σ > 1, this optimization










I(ι)dι > 0. (24)
Firm i ∈ [0, 1] produces its quantity qi according to qi = θci fi(x1, ..., xK), where θ > 0 is a
common and ci > 0 and individual productivity parameter. We assume that the production
function is homogeneous of degree 1/γi, γi ≥ 1, where the production factors x1, ..., xK are




i . This subsumes the case of constant marginal costs (where γi = 1 ∀i), which is the most
common assumption in applications of monopolistic competition, in particular in international
trade (Melitz, 2003). Our analysis is not confined to linear costs, nor do we generally require
that all production functions be homogeneous of the same degree.
We note that firms can differ ex ante in various ways. First, the firms can differ in their
productive efficiency ci (a larger ci means a lower productivity) or in their qualities ri. Second,
firms can differ in their returns to scale γi. As our inequality analysis below shows, it plays a
27It is convenient to indicate firms by using subscripts, i.e., we write rs instead of r(s).
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decisive role, whether there is ex ante heterogeneity in the former two or in the latter.
4.1.2 Inequality Analysis
Because we allow for non-linear costs, it is hard to study the inequality effects with the conven-
tional approach, in particular also as we allow for an arbitrary number of firm types. To make
use of our inequality tools, the first step is to restate monopolistic competition as a competition






where qi is given by (24) for each price Pi. In terms of our framework, the price Pi thus
corresponds to the “action variable” ti. For any given price profile P we define the aggregator




s ds, where the value T = Z(P ) can be interpreted as a preference-
weighted inverse price index.29 These definitions and (24) yield the payoff function












which is of type (4). To see that ({Πi}, Z(·)) indeed constitute a competition for market shares,




T , which shows that (3) is verified. Thus,
we can apply the tools from Section (24) to study the inequality effects.
Each firm chooses its market share pi to maximize (26) and, after some algebraic manipula-







η(γi−1)+1T γi ≡ ϕ(i), (27)
in this model.30
The market conditions of interest are disposable income I, consumer preferences η, productive
efficiency θ or the quality level r (assuming that ri = r ∀i). Considering (27), we observe that
the equilibrium functions g(·), ϕ(·) display the Power Function property from Proposition 3 if
and only if γi = γ ∀i ∈ I, i.e., if and only if all firms are subject to exactly the same returns
to scale. Moreover, disposable income I and quality r (ri = r ∀i) are level variables if and
only if all firms are subject to the same returns to scale, which is easy to see by applying the
separability criterion from Section 3.1.1 to g(i) in (27). This suggests that the homogeneity
degree γi plays a central role for the inequality effect, and we therefore consider separably the
cases where i) the scale effects are identical, and ii) the scale effects are heterogeneous.
Identical Scale Effects We begin with the case where γi = γ ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ I. The firms can
be ex ante heterogeneous in ci or ri, where we assume the heterogeneity to be such that wi is
28Equilibrium existence and uniqueness for this model are well-known; both also follow from our general
Existence Theorem B.2 in Appendix B.2.
29This is an example where the aggregator function Z(·) does not equal the sum of actions (i.e., prices).
30Note that g(i) and ϕ(i) as we defined them in (27)do not exactly coincide with marginal benefits and costs,
which is not important, however, from the perspective of our inequality tools.
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increasing over agent types, such that pi is a Class I or Class II density.
31 If all firms have the
same returns to scale, then I, θ and a common quality level r (for ri = r ∀i) must be level vari-
ables. Corollary 1 then immediately implies that these variables must be inequality preserving.
Consumer preferences η, as well as the reruns to scale γ, are not level variables but common
market conditions, as all firms in the market are affected by them, although differentially. We
note from Proposition 3 any rotation must be monotonic if the direct-aggregative effect R is
sign-uniform for all firms given that (27) verifies the power function property. Moreover, the
power function structure allows us to invoke Lemma 3 to infer how the payoff shares evolve.
The following proposition summarize the inequality effects of this model.
Proposition 5 Suppose that all firms have identical returns to scale (γi = γ ∀i) and wi is in-
creasing over firm types. The inequality effects of consumer-side parameters η, I, and technology-
side parameters γ, θ as well as r (if ri = r ∀i) are summarized by Table 1, where all rotations















dI > 0 - - - - - ↑







dθ, dr > 0 - - - - - -
Table 1: Inequality effects with identical returns to scale
By Proposition 5, income I as well as industry-wide quality and efficiency levels r, θ are
inequality-preserving under homogeneous scale effects, both with respect to market and pay-
off shares. Observing that changes in θ could also be interpreted as introducing or altering
a production tax (or subsidy), Proposition 5 implies that such policy measures are inequality
preserving as well.
Note that an increase in income, however, is not entirely neutral. In particular, dI > 0
induces a rich-gets-richer effect in terms of absolute profits Πi. That is, the gap Πi − Πj is
strictly increasing in I for any given pair of firms with j B i. In particular, this means that
the strongest firms gain most, while market shares remain stable. To see this, note from Table
1 that all payoff shares remain constant while the aggregate payoff increases. These two facts
imply that each firm must realize a strictly higher payoff, and Lemma 2 then shows that the
payoff gaps must increase.
By contrast, variations in the willingness to substitute η or in the returns to scale γ induce
monotonic rotations of the market and payoff shares. With stronger substitutes (dη > 0), com-
petition becomes more intense which, intriguingly, lets already rich firms expand their market
size, thereby marginalizing small firms. Likewise, market shares are less equally dispersed with
stronger returns to scale (lower γ). This implies that the standard case of constant marginal
costs (γ = 1) induces most market inequality among all technologies with non-increasing returns
to scale.
31For example, this holds if ci is increasing while ri = r ∀i.
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Finally, it is interesting to observe in Table 1 that relative prices can move quite indepen-
dently from market shares and relative payoffs if η or γ changes. For instance, relative prices
Pi
Pj
never respond to η and γ in the special case of constant marginal costs, while they change
with non-linear production costs, depending on the quality-cost ratios.
Why are income I, efficiency θ and quality r inequality preserving, while σ and γ are not?
To understand this intuitively, note from (27) that, e.g., and increase in income has a uniform
effect on all firms, and thus provides an identical incentive for all firms to increase their market
shares. Such an increase, however, is more costly to bear for firms that already possess a large
market share due to increasing marginal costs. The multiplicative separable structure of payoffs
now implies that these two effects level off in equilibrium, resulting in a stable market share
distribution.
By contrast, the common market variables γ and η exert differential effects on the various
firms, leading to effects that are not offset by equilibrium forces. To see why, note that if prod-
ucts are stronger substitutes (η increases), competition is intensified, implying that all firms
tend to save costs by cutting back on market shares. In addition, dη > 0 also increases how
sensitively marginal costs respond to changes in pi, and more so for firms with larger market
shares. This allows such firms to adopt better to the more competitive market environment
than their smaller counterparts.
We remark that our inequality tools allow for a richer analysis than conducted here. As an
illustration, suppose that ri = r while ci is increasing over firm types. Consider an innovation
which increases efficiency (dci < 0), but differentially so for different firms (i.e., dci 6= dcj).
Such an innovation is inequality preserving if and only if dcici =
dcj
cj
for all firms, meaning that
the innovation affects each firm in a proportional way (and thus works like a level variable).
By contrast, if dcici <
dcj
cj
< 0 ∀j B i, such that the firms with a smaller market share benefit
proportionally less from the innovation, one can use Theorem 3 to prove that the innovation
triggers a monotonic OR of the market and payoff shares.
Heterogeneous Scale Effects We now consider the formally more challenging case, where
firm heterogeneity originates from different returns to scale. Let ri = ci = 1 ∀i ∈ I, such that
wi = 1/θ in (27), and γi ≥ 1 be an increasing and step function. We assume parameters to be
such that each firm produces qi ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ I in equilibrium, which assures that pi > pj for j B i,
such that pi belongs to Class I, and Pi < Pj as well as qi > qj for any j B i.32
Proposition 5 has shown that the common efficiency level θ or income I are inequality pre-
serving with identical returns to scale. The next two propositions highlight that this conclusion
breaks down once firms differ in their returns to scale.
Proposition 6 A common increase in efficiency (dθ > 0) induces a monotonic OR of market
and payoff shares. Winners (dΠi > 0) and losers (dΠi < 0) always coexist, where a firm wins if







whenever j B i, and the industry payoff Π(θ) ≡
∫
I Πi(θ)di verifies Π
′(θ) > 0.
32qi ≥ 1 holds if I is large (or c small) enough.
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The proof essentially consists of algebraic manipulations in order to apply Theorem 3.
Proposition 6 considers the case of an increase in efficiency (or a reduction in a production
tax), but draws a substantially different picture than its counterpart with identical scale effects.
With heterogeneous scale effects, dθ > 0 increases market inequality, creates winners and losers
in terms of absolute payoffs, decreases the aggregate payoff and affects relative prices, while all
these effects did not arise previously.
The reason for these deviations are the differential returns to scale. In particular, while
θ still is a level variable, the multiplicative separability of ϕ(i) in (i, p) and T is violated,
meaning that θ cannot be inequality preserving anymore by Corollary 1. Intuitively, the increase
in θ unambiguously decreases all individual prices Pi, which essentially is a standard pass-
through effect reflecting lower marginal costs. However, the leading firms manage to garner a
disproportionally larger amount of consumer demand as they can afford to decrease their prices
disproportionally more due to their advantages in the returns to scale, which results in a larger
market share and payoff as before.
One notable consequence is that if the firm heterogeneity is rooted in different returns to
scale, then the leading firms have an incentive to innovate if innovation increases θ, even though
the innovation spills over to all competitors. By contrast, laggards are hurt by such innovations,
and therefore do not seek them.
Turning to income effects, the following proposition shows that consumer income seizes to be
inequality preserving once the firms differ in their returns to scale. Specifically, an increasing
income now implies that quantity growth coexists with a growing inequality of market shares
and payoffs.
Proposition 7 An increase in consumer income dI > 0 triggers a monotonic OR of market










for any j B i.
The reason is that now I fails to be a level variable, meaning that I has a differential impact on
the firms, which jointly with the differential effect on marginal costs as in the case of dθ > 0,
generates an inequality effect favoring the firms with larger market sizes.
4.1.3 Discussion
Propositions 5 - 7 reveal substantial differences depending on whether all firms have the same
scale effects or not. As the case of identical returns contains the standard premise of constant
marginal costs, our finding complements and generalizes a result by Mrázová and Neary (2017).
These authors study how the shape of demand, summarized by its “demand manifold”, deter-
mines the pass-through and competition effects with constant marginal cost firms. They show
that consumer income does not affect the dispersion of firm payoffs in case of CES demand.
Proposition 5 extends this result to non-linear costs, showing that the distributional neutrality
of income with CES demand is actually driven by the premise of homogeneous scale effects
across firms.
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Proposition 7 complements their finding by showing that level variables seize to be inequality
preserving once firms differ in the economies of scale, despite CES-demand. Specifically, income
growth, common efficiency gains or general cost reductions lead to quantity growth jointly with
increasing relative prices, and a growing inequality in market and payoff shares. More generally,
level variables now induce inequality effects, because the firms with comparably favorable scale
economies can respond more flexibly to a common change of the economic environment.
It is worthwhile to mention that these inequality effects are not driven by the firm-side
market power contained in monopolistic competition; in Appendix B.6 we prove that the same
inequality effects arise with perfectly competitive firms.33 Moreover, we shall see in the next
sections that these inequality effects are a vindication of a more general pattern, which occurs
in symmetric competitions, where the equilibrium value per unit of market share is identical to
all firms.
4.2 Market Inequality in Models of Perfect Competition
This section derives the inequality effects for various examples of perfect competition, consider-
ing inequality on the firm- and consumer-side. For consumers, our notion of market inequality
concentrates on consumption inequality given its importance for welfare (Attanasio and Pista-
ferri, 2016).
4.2.1 Perfect Competition
We first consider the firm-side inequality effects in a perfectly competitive market with exoge-
nous demand. The insights obtained from this setting are helpful for situating the previous
findings from monopolistic competition, and useful also for the general equilibrium applications
we study in Section 4.2.2.
Let i ∈ [0, 1] denote a perfectly competitive firm in a market for a homogeneous good. Each
firm takes the market price P as given and supplies a quantity qi ≥ 0, produced with a strictly
convex cost function Φ(i, ·), and Φ(i, 0) = 0. As in Section 4.1, we think of Φ(i, q) as arising from
a production function, where the inputs are acquired on competitive factor markets. As before,
this implies that Φ(i, q) = ciq
γi if and only if the production function is 1/γi-homogeneous. The
inverse demand is P = P (
∫
qidi;x), where x denotes a demand shifter with Px > 0.
As in Section 4.1, the market share pi ≡ Pqi∫ Pqsds is the share of consumption expenditures
earned by firm i. Further, T ≡
∫
qidi is total market supply, where PT (T ;x) < 0 by the Law of
Demand. Because pi = qi/T , condition (3) is verified, and restating the payoff as a competition
for market shares yields
Πi = Pqi − Φ(i, qi) = piPT − Φ(i, piT ). (28)
Thus, the equilibrium equation (5) takes on the form
P (T ;x) = ϕ(i, piT ). (29)
33Actually, we even find that market power per se does not induce a different dispersion of market shares:
While market power increases the level of profits, equilibrium forces balance in a way that the market share
distribution of perfect competition and monopolistic competition must perfectly coincide.
26
Regarding the ex ante heterogeneity, we assume that there are finitely many cost types, such
that p(·) is Class I, where Φ(i, q) < Φ(j, q) and ϕ(i, q) < ϕ(j, q) whenever j B i and q > 0. This
assures that pi > pj , Πi > Πj for j B i in equilibrium.
The equilibrium equation (29) is a variant of (11), and x is a level variable. Thus, by Corollary
1, the inequality effects depend entirely on the cost functions ϕ(i), i.e., the slope or curvature
of market demand P (T ;x) plays no role for whether inequality effects arise.
It is easy to check that T ′(x) > 0, e.g., by using the procedure outlined in Section 3.3. Because
x is a level variable and qi = pi/T , Corollary 2 then tells us that x is inequality preserving if
and only if all firms have exactly the same returns to scale, i.e., all cost functions are of the




, determines whether a rotation occurs – and if yes, these rotations must even be
partially monotonic by Corollary 6. These insights are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 The demand shifter x is inequality preserving if and only if Φ(i, q) = ciq
γ,
γ > 1, ∀i ∈ I. Further, dx > 0 increases the equilibrium price P = P (T ;x) and the quantity qi
supplied by each firm, and induces a partially monotonic OR (IR) of the market shares in the
sense of (17) (in the sense of (18)) if ψj > (<)ψi ∀j B i in equilibrium.
The elasticity ψi captures how easily a firm can adjust its production to changing market
conditions, which is crucial for whether a firm manages to expand its market share following
an upward shift in market demand. If Φ(i, q) = ciq
γ
i ∀i, then all firms are equally able to
respond to the demand increase, resulting in stable market shares. However, if the firms with
larger market shares also are those that can adjust more easily, i.e., ψi < ψj , j B i, this leads
to a redistribution of market shares from the tail to the top. The equilibrium adjustments are
even such that the firms who gain market shares can increase these more than proportionally
compared to any other firm with a smaller market share. These findings are reversed if ψj < ψi
∀jB i, meaning that the firms with the smallest market shares are those to adjust most flexibly.
Market and Payoff Shares The simple structure of (29) allows us to say more about the
relation between market shares p(·) and payoff shares s(·), mostly due to Lemma 3.
Proposition 9 Market and payoff shares perfectly coincide (si = pi ∀i ∈ I) if and only if
Φ(i, q) = ciq
γ, ∀i ∈ I, and s(·) is a monotonic OR (IR) of p(·) if and only if ψj < (>)ψi ∀jB i.
Further, x increases all absolute payoffs Πi and payoff gaps Πi −Πj, j B i.
In general, the elasticity ψi depends on the agent index i as well as on the equilibrium quantity
qi. The two extreme cases, where ψi depends either only on i or only on qi allow for stronger
results.
First, ψi depends on i, but not on q, ∀i, if and only if Φ(i, q) = ciqγi , which corresponds to
the case where the firms differ in their returns to scale, as in Section 4.1. If, e.g., Φ(i, q) = cqγi ,
and γi < γj , j B i, then s(·) must be a monotonic IR of p(·) by Proposition 9, and an increase
in demand must induce a monotonic OR of p(·) and s(·) by Corollary 7 and Proposition 4.
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Second, the case where ψ(i) depends only on the quantity qi but not directly on the firm
index i occurs if and only if the costs are of the form Φ(i, q) = ciH(q). In this case, it is easy
to verify that dx > 0 induces an OR (IR) of p(·), and s(·) is IR (OR)of p(·), if H
′′(q)q
H′(q) is strictly
decreasing (increasing) in q > 0.34
Proposition 9 predicts a tight relation between market and payoff shares and the inequality
effects induced by dx > 0. One particular conclusion, in terms of observables, is that x must
induce inequality effects if and only if the market and payoff share distributions disagree.
Corollary 8 The market and payoff shares coincide if and only if x is inequality preserving. If
p(·) is a monotonic OR (IR) of s(·), then dx > 0 must induce an OR (IR) of p(·).
By Corollary 8 not every pattern can arise. For example, we cannot have that p(·) and s(·) are
ranked in terms of a monotonic OR while an upward shift in demand decreases the inequality
in the market share distribution.
Discussion Compared to monopolistic competition, the above model is adequate for situa-
tions where the market is small relative to the economy, such that wealth or spillover effects
between markets are negligible. Nevertheless, both models yield similar inequality effects with
respect to a level variable x: x is inequality-preserving if and only if all firms operate with
identical returns to scale. By contrast, an increase in x generates an increasing polarization of
the market shares if firms differ in their returns to scale. The underlying reason is that both
models feature a symmetric competition, in thus that the value per unit of market share is
identical for all firms (see Section 4.4).
Another interpretation of dx > 0 in the current model is that this amounts to an introduction
or a decrease in a quantity or sales tax – the former yields P (T ;x) = P (T ) − x and the latter
P (T ;x) = (1 − x)P (T ). Such a tax is a level variable, meaning that it always is inequality
preserving if and only if all firms feature exactly the same returns to scale. By contrast, if
the firms with the largest market shares also have the lowest elasticity of marginal costs, e.g.,
because of favorable returns to scale, then a tax induces an IR of market shares, while a subsidy
creates an OR of p(·).
4.2.2 General Equilibrium Applications
Partial Equilibrium In this application, we consider the inequality effects of a common
market condition, such as a market-level innovation or a tax, in a partial equilibrium setting.
This setting allows us to study the interdependence between the inequality effects caused on
either market side if there are no wealth effects on the consumer side. By contrast to most of
the existing work on taxation, which focuses on the tax incidence between firms and consumers
(see, e.g., Mieszkowski, 1969), our approach elicits the inequality effects within each market side.
34The case where H(q) = qγ exactly yields the intermediate case, where ψi is constant and equal across all
agents, making x inequality preserving.
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Firms and consumers are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] and ic ∈ [0, 1], respectively. Utility is quasilinear
U(ic) = mic + V (ic, q
d
ic
), where mic ∈ R is a numeraire, and qdic ≥ 0 is the demand for the
consumption good in the market under study. Each consumer is endowed with ωic > 0 of the






Consumers are ex-ante heterogeneous in the desirability V (ic, ·) of the consumption good.
We assume that V (ic, ·) is strictly increasing and concave, where v(ic, q) ≡ ∂qV (ic, q) satisfies
v(jc, q) < v(ic, q) ∀q > 0 and any jc B ic, such that consumers are ordered left-to right in
terms of preferences. We consider consumption inequality (Attanasio and Pistaferri, 2016) in




/T d denote the share of total consumption T d ≡
∫
qicdic acquired by consumer ic.
Each firm obtains the numeraire on a competitive market, and uses it to produce the con-
sumption good, which is competitively sold to consumers at a price P . Then, payoffs have the
form (28), where pi is firm i’s share of total consumption expenditures and T =
∫
qidi.
A competitive equilibrium consists of two market share functions pi, p
d
ic
> 0, two quantities
T, T d such that T = T d, and
P = v(ic, p
d
ic
T ) ic ∈ [0, 1]
P = ϕ(i, piT ) i ∈ [0, 1],
(30)
and (30) are the optimality conditions for consumers and firms. Regarding inequality effects,
(30) shows that an unilateral change on one market side affects the market share dispersion on
the other side only via the direct-aggregative effect.36 Thus, the inequality effects within the
two market sides are generally independent of each other. We now study the inequality effects
of a subsidy τ > 0 on the supply side, such that the LHS of the 2nd equation in (30) is P + τ .
Proposition 10 An increase in a subsidy, dτ > 0, implies that P ′(τ) < 0, T ′(τ) > 0, and
induces the following inequality effects:
• Firms: Propositions 8-9 and Corollary 8 apply.
• Consumers: τ is inequality-preserving with respect to consumption shares pdic if and only
if V (ic, q) = αicq
µ ∀ic. If the q-elasticities of v(ic, q) are increasing (decreasing) in ic over
consumer types, then dτ > 0 causes an OR (IR) of pdic.
To understand Proposition 10, the key observation is that τ is a level variable for each market
side through its effects on P . Proposition 10 shows that the firm-side and consumer-side in-
equality effects are determined by the same fundamental logic, while there is no interdependence
between the inequality effects. The reason is that wealth effects play no role, and the market
price P alone determines the behavior on each market side.
In case of consumers, Proposition 10 implies that if the heavy users are also the consumers
with a comparably more elastic marginal utility in absolute value, then the price reduction due
to the subsidy leads to more consumption inequality in equilibrium.37
35As we allow mic ∈ R, only interior solutions to the consumer problem can exist, meaning that income
inequality plays no role for consumption inequality in the consumption good.
36E.g., for consumers, (30) implies that v(ic, p
d
icT ) = v(jc, p
d
jcT ), which shows that any exogenous change on
the firm side affects inequality on the consumer side only via T .
37This occurs, e.g., in case of log-utility V (ic, q) = aicLn(1 + q).
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Note that if τ is a tax rather than a subsidy, Proposition 10 applies analogously with a
“reversed sign” of the inequality effects. Further, it is easy to verify that the tax incidence is
independent from the inequality effects induced within each market side: Proposition 10 also
applies if the subsidy (or the tax) is levied on the consumer side.
Windfall Gains and Income Inequality In this application, we ask how a windfall gain
accruing to all consumers affect the inequality on the firm- and consumer-side in a stylized
general equilibrium model, given that consumers are heterogeneous in their endowments and
ownership shares. Firms and consumers are indexed as before. Consumers initially own all
resources and sell them to firms, which produce a homogeneous consumption good. All markets
are competitive. Regarding ex-ante heterogeneity, the firms differ in their cost functions as
before, and consumers differ in their endowments.
As previously, the firm-side market shares pi refer to the market shares of total consumption
expenditure, and T =
∫
qidi is aggregate production. If P denotes the price of the consumption
good, payoffs are again of the form (28).
Consumers differ in their income, where we distinguish between two key sources of income
inequality: Differences in resource endowments or differences in firm ownership shares. Let
ωic > 0 denote the resource endowment of consumer ic, and ω ≡
∫
ωicdic. Further, capital
income earned by ic is Sic = sicΠ, where s(·) is the ex ante distribution of ownership shares
(
∫
sicdic = 1), and Π =
∫
Πidi is aggregate profit. Both ωic and sic are (weakly) decreasing
in consumer index ic, such that consumers are ordered left-to-right in terms of total income.
Each consumer ic spends all her income to acquire q
d
ic
units of the consumption good. Thus,
if T d ≡
∫















A competitive equilibrium consists of two market share functions p(·), pd(·), and aggregate
quantities with T = T d = ω+ΠP . On the firm-side, each pi maximizes (28) given that T =
ω+Π
P . On the consumer-side, each p
d
ic
verifies (31) for T d = (ω + Π)/P . We assume the ex
ante heterogeneity to be such that p(·), pd(·) are Class I densities. The following proposition
summarizes the inequality effects caused by an unforeseen windfall gain such that dωic = dω > 0
for each consumer.
Proposition 11 A windfall gain dω > 0 increases T , P , and Π. The inequality effects are:
• Firms: Propositions 8-9 and Corollary 8 apply.
• Consumers: (i) If income inequality results from the resource endowment, i.e., sic = 1
∀ic, then dw > 0 induces a monotonic IR of pd(·) (and total income shares). (ii) If income
inequality results from the capital endowments, i.e., ωic = ω ∀ic, then dω > 0 induces a
monotonic OR (IR) of pd(·) (and total income shares) if Π(ω) is strictly convex (concave).
Proposition 11 shows that the firm-side inequality effects are solely determined by the production
technologies; neither the ownership structure nor possibly substantial shifts in consumption play
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a role. This is intuitive because, as in our last application, the consumer-side affects the firms
only via the market price P , showing that ω is a level variable for firms (but not for consumers).
On the consumer-side, the inequality effects caused by the windfall gain depend on the precise
source of the income inequality. If income inequality originates mostly from the resource en-
dowment, then the windfall gain increases equality. The reason is that the income effect caused
by the windfall gain is weaker, in relative terms, for wealthier consumers if differences in capital
income are negligible. By contrast, the wealthy can benefit from the gain, relative to the poor,
if the income inequality originates mainly from the dispersion of capital holdings. The intuition
is that the windfall gain has the same uniform effect on total income for all consumers, while
the increase in firm profits causes a differential effect. If aggregate profits are convex in ω, then
this profit increases faster than linearly, which benefits wealthier consumers more, resulting in
an OR of consumption (and total income) shares.
Labor, Leisure and Inequality our last application of perfect competition addresses the
connections between consumption and leisure inequality, which is a relatively fresh idea (At-
tanasio and Pistaferri, 2016). Specifically, we ask how the dispersion of consumption and leisure
across consumers depends on the importance of consumption relative to leisure, as well as on
labor productivity.
Each consumer ic ∈ [0, 1] owns a unit of perfectly divisible labor. The salary earend in the
labor market is used to purchase a quantity qic of a consumption good. As consumers value
leisure, they face a trade-off between leisure and forgone consumption opportunities. We follow
most of the literature by assuming that utility is separable in consumption and leisure (see, e.g.,







where fic ∈ [0, 1] denotes the amount of leisure, and the parameter α ∈ (0, 1) quantifies the
importance of consumption relative to leisure. The budget constraint is qic = (1− fic)w + Sic ,
where w denotes the real wage and Sic = sicΠ ≥ 0 is capital income.
Consumers are ex-ante heterogeneous in their payoff shares, where sic is decreasing over con-
sumer types. As before, we focus on consumption inequality, where pdic = qic/T
d, T d =
∫
qicdic,
denotes ic’s share of total consumption. Assuming an interior solution, constrained maximiza-










38 Thus, we immediately observe that the equilibrium con-
sumption inequality must mirror income inequality, which is a recently rehabilitated empirical
fact (Aguiar and Bils, 2015; Attanasio and Pistaferri, 2016).
Each firm hires labor to produce qi ≥ 0 units of the consumption good, which is produced




1/γ , where the efficiency parameter ci > 0 is increasing over
firm types, γ > 1, and θ > 0 is labor productivity. Further, pi denotes the share of total
consumption expenditure earned by firm i, such that the payoff is Πi = piT − wciθ (piT )
γ . As the
consumer parameter α affects firms via w, α is a level variable. Thus, α and θ are inequality
preserving on the firm-side, which simplifies the analysis of the consumer-side.
38This interior solution requires that Sic ≤ α1−αw which, for simplicity, we shall assume to hold. The main
results carry through if the boundary condition fic ≤ 1 becomes binding for some consumers.
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We now derive how the importance of consumption relative to leisure affects consumption
inequality by deriving the inequality effects induced by an increase in the relative importance
of consumption (dα > 0). In addition, we also derive the consumer-side inequality effects of an
increase in labor productivity θ.
Proposition 12 Let jc B ic. An increase in the importance of consumption (dα > 0) induces







consumption and aggregate labor supply, while wages fall. Moreover, dqic > dqjc whenever
dqic > 0. By contrast, labor productivity (θ) is inequality preserving in terms of market shares,
while absolute consumption (and income) gaps increase in θ (i.e., dqic > dqjc).
The intuition for α is that if consumption matters more, consumers seek to supply more labor
to afford more consumption. The increased labor supply reduces real wages and increases
profits, which benefits capital owners and therefore increases consumption inequality. Because
the dispersion of consumption shares, pdic , coincides with the dispersion of leisure, an increase
in the propensity to work also increases the inequality in leisure. Additionally, one can show
that, as real wages plunge, the poorest may even end up with a lower consumption level despite
a higher propensity to consume.39 By contrast, if leisure becomes more important (dα < 0),
aggregate leisure consumption increases jointly with an increase in relative leisure fjc/fic of the
poor. Such a tendency has been observed, e.g., in US data (Aguiar and Hurst, 2007).40
By contrast, labor productivity has no inequality effects on the consumer side, independent
of the value of α, because equilibrium wages and aggregate firm profits increase at the same rate
in θ, meaning that the individual consumer income also increases at the same rate. Because
consumption and income levels increase, this necessarily implies that the absolute consumption
and income gaps must increase between consumers. However, other than in case of dα > 0,
this result depends on the fact that there are no inequality effects on the firm side. Otherwise,
aggregate profits may evolve differently than wages, in which case inequality effects necessarily
must arise.41
As individual consumption amounts to a constant fraction α of total income Vic ≡ w + Sic ,
Proposition 12 shows that the distribution of income evolves like the distribution of consumption
if θ increases. In particular, dθ > 0 induces an OR of the income shares vic ≡ Vic/
∫
Vscdsc.
More generally, Proposition 12 shows that economies with a stronger preference for consumption
relative to labor, ceteris paribus, may feature more consumption and income inequality. This
broad prediction is reconcilable with empirical evidence comparing European countries with the
US, as the latter features more income inequality and a weaker preference for leisure.42
39For example, if a positive mass of consumers holds no shares at all(si = 0) this must always be the case.
40A more ambitious model could allow α to vary across consumers, e.g., because this matters empirically
(Heathcote et al., 2014).
41This is easy to see, noting that relative income, Vic/Vjc , is non-constant in θ if and only if aggregate profits
develop at a different pace than wages (Π′(θ)/Π(θ) 6= w′(θ)/w(θ).
42See, e.g., Blanchard (2004) or Maoz (2010) for leisure preferences in the US relative to Europe. Regarding
income inequality, see, e.g., Federal Reserve.
32
4.3 Competition for Prizes
Another prominent instance of competition, that yet differs from the market-based models in
the last sections, arises in situations where agent interaction can be described as a competition
for prize. An example are contests, where different agents i ∈ I compete in efforts ti ≥ 0 to
seize a single prize of a fixed value V > 0 (Konrad, 2009). While the literature on contests
is comprehensive, papers that study inequality in contests are scarce.43 Other applications
suggest that the prize value V (·) is agent-specific or depends on aggregate efforts T =
∫
tidi.
For example, litigation expenditures (Posner, 1992), salary negotiations (Amegashie, 1999), or
money invested to obtain a monopoly franchise (Chung, 1996) can influence the revenue earned
by the winning agent.
The Model Each agent chooses an effort ti ≥ 0 that influences her chance of winning a prize.
For given efforts and T ≡
∫
tidi, the winning chances are determined by pi = p(ti, T ), where∫
p(ti,
∫
tsds)di = 1, such that pi conceptually is a market share. The success function p(ti, T )
is strictly increasing in ti, and zero-homogeneous in (ti, T ). The latter means that only relative
efforts matters, which marks a distinct feature of contests relative to market competition, where
generally also the absolute values of prices or quantities matter. These assumptions imply that,
wlog, we can assume that p(ti, T ) = ti/T .
44 Finally, the prize value generally is determined by
a prize function V (i, ti, T ).
Given a cost function Φ(i, ti), this yields a competition for market shares with payoffs
Πi = piV (i, piT, T ;x)− Φ (i, piT ) , (33)
where x is a prize shifter (∂V (·)∂x > 0). Consistent with our previous definition, we let si ≡
Πi/
∫
Πidi denote the (expected) payoff share of agent i. We take (33) to satisfy Assumption 1,
such that a unique equilibrium exists. Further, we always assume the ex ante agent heterogeneity
to be such that p(·) is Class I.
In the equilibrium, the agents take the aggregate effort T as given when choosing their own
efforts. In Appendix B.5, we adjust our approach to include the case where the agents fully
account for their own effects on the aggregate, thus embedding the notion of Nash equilibrium.
We first state the inequality effects distinguishing between a homogeneous and a heterogeneous
prize function. Next, we study the inequality effects induced by dispersing the prize value over
two prices. Finally, we consider an effort-dependent prize function inspired by an advertising
context, and discuss the inequality effects of an increased effectiveness of advertising.
Homogeneous Prize Value Consider payoff (33) where the prize is determined by a common
value V = V (T ;x) with Vx > 0.
45 This gives V (T ;x) = ϕ(i, piT ) as equilibrium equation,
43Perhaps most closely related is Acemoglu and Jensen (2013), who utilize the aggregative structure to ob-
tain comparative-static predictions of the aggregate and extremal efforts, and sometimes of certain individual
strategies. However, their paper does not deal with inequality effects.
44Zero-homogeneity implies that p(t, T ) = p̂(t/T ), and the only function p̂ that satisfies
∫
p̂(ti/T )di = 1,
T =
∫
tidi, for any effort profile t(·) must be linear, i.e., p̂(x) = x (Hefti and Lareida, 2020).
45This includes the case where V = V (x) is a fixed prize.
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which is a variant of (11). A direct comparison with (29) shows that price competition and the
present contest are variants of the same fundamental structure. Although these models capture
substantially different types of competition, they predict the same inequality effects:
Proposition 13 The inequality effects on the market and payoff shares induced by dx > 0 in
the contest model correspond to Propositions 8-9 and Corollary 8.
In our previous competition models, costs of the form Φ(i, t) = cit
γ amounted to the case of
homogeneous returns to scale in production. The analogue in the present model is that the
parameter γ captures how sensitive the success function responds to changes in efforts. Larger
values of γ represent “noisier” contests, where the agents have less influence on their success
chances (Hefti, 2018). A simple application of Theorem 3 shows that an increase in contest noise
induces a monotonic OR of p(·) and s(·), similar to Proposition 5 in monopolistic competition.
Heterogeneous Prize Values We now turn to the case where agents are ex ante heteroge-
neous in their prize valuations. Let Vi = V (i;x) be increasing over agent types. We consider
the inequality effects induced if the valuations increase (dVi ≡ V ′i (x) > 0), but possibly differ-
entially so for the different agent types (always preserving the agent order). The equilibrium
condition (5) thus is Vi = ϕ(piT ). We note that the prize shifter x is a level variable if and
only if dVi/Vi = dVj/Vj ∀i, j, where the latter condition means that all prize values must vary
in proportion.
Proposition 14 If x is a level variable, then the prize shift is inequality preserving if and only
if Φ(ti) = cit
γ
i . Let Φ(ti) = ct
γ
i . Then, a monotonic OR (IR) of market and payoff shares
p(·), s(·) results if and only if dV (i)V (i) ≥ 0 is strictly decreasing (increasing) in i over all agent
types, and payoff shares are a monotonic OR of market shares.
With a power cost function, the payoff shares now must be less equally dispersed than the
market shares, other than with a homogeneous prize function. This is due to the fact that
agents with large market shares are also the ones to benefit more per unit of market share.
If costs are not given by a power function, the elasticities of marginal costs, ψi, can matter for
the inequality effects. A simple combination of 14 and Corollary 4 shows, e.g., that if dViVi >
dVj
Vj
and ψj ≥ ψi ∀j B i, then an OR of p(·) results.
Proposition 14 may help to put our previous results on income inequality in a greater context.
The equilibrium equations characterizing the dispersion of consumption (and income) inequality
in the models of Propositions 11 and 12 are of the form Vi ≡ ωi + Si = (piT )P , which shows
a formal connection to the present contest. Specifically, the models offer the same predictions
if and only if costs in the current contest models are multiplicatively separable in pi and T ,
which requires that costs are power functions Φ(i) = cit
γ
i . We can then use Proposition 14
to study the inequality effects caused by a varying consumer income. Specifically, the results
in Proposition 14 imply that whenever total income ωi + Si (endogenously) increases for all
consumers, the inequality effects are entirely determined by the ratio dVi/Vi; whenever this
ratio decreases (increases) in i over consumer types, an OR (IR) of income (and consumption)
shares results. For example, a windfall gain in income, such that dVi = dV > 0 ∀i, must always
cause more income and consumption equality in the sense of a monotonic IR.
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Idiosyncratic Changes We use the current setting to demonstrate that our inequality tools
can be also applied in case of a purely idiosyncratic market condition. Suppose that dVi > 0
only for agent type i, while dVj = 0 for everybody else.
46 Note that a small change dVi > 0 will
preserve the agent order as captured by p(·). To obtain the inequality effects, we simply need
to evaluate (9) with the above valuation shock.
Proposition 15 If Φ(ti) = ct
γ
i , then the idiosyncratic change dVi > 0 increases pi, while the
pj for all other agent types decreases in proportion to each other.
Thus, all agents expect for i lose, and the loss is most pronounced for the strongest agents.
Two Prizes We now study the inequality effects of introducing (or modifying) a second prize.
This is of interest, e.g., to sport economics, where assuring a certain “competitive balance”
between different teams is a central aspect of tournament design as this adds a desired element
of unpredictability to such contests (Szymanski, 2003). More generally, our contribution differs
from the existing literature on contest architecture, as we seek to elicit the full distributive effects
of a change in the prize structure, rather than identifying the reward schemes that maximize
the aggregate efforts or the winning effort.
Consider a contest with two fixed prizes V1 > 0 and V1 ≥ V2 ≥ 0. To focus on the inequality
effects induced by these prizes, we assume that cost functions are Φ(i, ti) = cit
γ
i , where ci is
increasing over agent types.47 The probability to win the first prize is pi = ti/T while, by
sampling with replacement, (1 − pi)pi is the chance of obtaining the second prize.48 These
formulas only make sense by assuming a finite number N of atomistic agents. Formally, the
set of agents is I ≡ {1/N, .., n/N, ...., 1}, such that i ∈ [0, 1] for any i ∈ I, and pi ∈ [0, 1] is
a probability mass function rather than a density.49 Expressed in terms of market shares, the
payoff function thus is
Πi = piV1 + (1− pi)piV2 − c(i) (piT )γ . (34)
The following proposition shows how a change in the prize scheme (V1, V2) affects the distribution
of the chances pi to seize the first prize or any prize wi ≡ pi + (1− pi)pi.
Proposition 16 If dV1V1 > (<)
dV2
V2
an OR (IR) of the chance to win the first prize pi results. If
dV1
V1
= dV2V2 , pi is invariant to the allocation of prize money. The previous patterns also apply to
the chance of winning any prize wi, provided that pi < 1/2 ∀i.
Comparing Proposition 16 with its single-prize (Proposition 13) shows that, given the assumed
cost function, a unilateral change of V1 or V2 only induces inequality effects in the model with
46In terms of the general setting from Section 3, this formally corresponds to the case where dVi =
gx(i, p(i), T ;x) > 0 and dVj = gx(j, p(j), T, x) = 0 ∀j 6= i.
47As we know from previous results, this cost function works in a distributionally “neutral” way. It is straight-
forward to adjust our analysis for other cost functions.
48By sampling with replacement, we mean that if agent i does not win the first prize, for which the chance was
pi = ti/T , then i competes again with the same effort and the same agents for the second prize, i.e., the agent
who won the first prize is not removed from the pool. Thus, the chance of i to win the second prize, given that
i has not won the first prize, also corresponds to ti/T .
49It is straightforward to verify that all inequality results from Section 3 that pertain to Class I densities also
apply to the case where pi is a probability mass function defined over a given finite set of atomistic agents.
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two prizes, while the prize level was inequality preserving in the single-prize case. Moreover, the
two prizes have diametrically opposite effects on inequality, as an increase of the first (second)
prize implies more inequality (equality) in the first-prize winning chances pi, and likely also in
the overall winning chances wi.
With respect to designing a balanced contests, such as a sports tournament, Proposition 16
suggests that if the overall prize money V = V1 + V2 increases, then both prizes need to be
increased proportionally (dV1/V 1 = dV2/V2) for pi or si to stay constant. Likewise, Proposition
16 shows how changing the composition of a given prize budget V ≡ V1 + V2 > 0 affects the
dispersion of success chances. Because dV1 < 0 and dV2 > 0 both imply an IR, ceteris paribus,
it follows that an even prize split V1 = V2 = V/2 must generate the most balanced contest,
while setting V1 = V (a single-prize contest) yields the most imbalanced contest. In addition,
there is an effort-equality trade-off because aggregate effort T (V1, V2) decreases if V2 = V − V1
increases.50
Advertising for Attention A central aspect of advertising is the attraction of consumer at-
tention. If attention is an exhaustible resource, the competition for attention takes on the form
of a contest (Hefti, 2018). Besides attention-seeking, advertising can have persuasive effects
that alter the willingness-to-pay of attentive consumers (Bagwell, 2007). We next study how
these effects matter for the firm-side market shares.
Let ti quantify firm i’s advertising intensity, which affects its market share pi = ti/T due to
attracting consumer attention, and possibly also the willingness-to-pay of attentive consumers.
Regarding the latter, we set Vi(ti) = αti +β, where V (·) summarizes how much each firm earns
from its attentive consumers. The parameter β > 0 corresponds to a basic willingess-to-pay,
while α ≥ 0 is a “rate of persuasion”, capturing how advertising converts into revenue from
attentive consumers; if α = 0, advertising only serves to attract attention.
Expressed as a competition for market shares, the payoff is
Πi = pi (αpiT + β)− Φ(i, piT ), (35)
where Φ(·) are the total advertising expenditures, and ci is increasing over agent types, such
that p(·) is Class I. Formally, (35) is a non-trivial variant of (33) where the prize function
V (·) = αpiT + β depends on pi and T .
To concentrate on the inequality effects implied by the two aspects of advertising, we let
Φ(·) = ci(piT )γ , γ ≥ 2, implying that the cost side has a neutral effect on market inequality.
Further, we assume parameter values such that ti > 1 ∀i in equilibrium.51 The parameter γ
quantifies how subtle the market shares respond individual changes of effort. In the present
context, a larger value of γ means that it is harder for the firms to influence consumer attention
50To see that T (V1, V −V1) decreases in V1, use V2 = V −V1 in (49) and note that ∂∂V1 p(i) > 0. This is related
to Clark and Riis (1998), who consider the case of a multi-prize contest with symmetric contestants. Their main
concern is about the aggregate effort, and they find that highest aggregate effort requires to award only one prize.
51γ ≥ 2 assures the strong quasiconcavity of Π(i) in pi. Further, the requirement that ti > 1 ∀i simplifies the
proof of Proposition 17 below, and can be always assured, e.g. if ci is sufficiently low or β sufficiently high.
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to their favor.
The parameters α and γ determine the role of advertising for extracting consumer budget.
For instance, high values of γ and α imply that advertising increases firm revenue basically by
persuading attentive consumers, while it is utterly hard for firms to increase their amount of
attentive consumers. By contrast, low values of γ and α mean that a firm can best increase
its revenues by competing harder for consumer attention, while the willingness-to-pay of the
attentive consumers is mostly insensitive to advertising.
Proposition 17 An increase in the rate of persuasion (dα > 0) induces an OR of pi, while
less attentional control (dγ > 0) induces an IR of pi.
Proposition 17 offers two rationales how advertising may affect the market share dispersion.
First, we can expect to observe an increasing market concentration if advertising works more
persuasively. The intuition is that an increase in the worthiness of attracting attention must
benefit the firms with the largest market shares by most. These firms therefore have the
strongest incentive to increase the attention they receive. Second, market concentration must
be higher if firms have more influence on their chances to attract attention. This occurs because
firms with lower costs can better exploit their advantage the more sensitively consumer attention
responds to advertising.
4.4 Inequality Effects in Competition Models: A Synthesis
While the competition models covered in Section 4 represent vastly different forms of competi-
tion, comparing the various propositions shows that highly similar inequality patterns appear
in all these models. At the basic level, this follows because the different competition models
show a similar formal structure of their respective and equilibrium equations.
This becomes most evident if the competition model is stated as a competition for market
shares. It then is relatively easy to observe, e.g., that the firm-side competition for market
shares in monopolistic or perfect competition models is equivalent, from the formal viewpoint,
to a contest where the (endogenous) prize function is homogeneous across all agents. The
underlying, common structure in these cases can best be described as a symmetric competition,
in thus that the equilibrium value per unit of market share is identical to all firms.
In such a symmetric competition, the inequality effects induced by level variables depend
entirely on the properties of the cost functions, while properties like shape or curvature of the
marginal benefits play no role. More specifically, level variables are inequality preserving if and
only if costs are given by a common-elastic Power Function Φ(i, ti) = cit
γ
i . Such cost functions
are a natural choice of modeling in some circumstances, perhaps most prominently, in case
of homogeneous production functions. Moreover, we established a tight connection between
market and payoff shares if costs are given by power functions: These shares coincide if and
only if all agents have a common-elastic power function. Taken together, the previous facts
imply that, in terms of observables, level variables cause inequality effects if and only if market
and payoff shares disagree.
The reason for these results is that the equilibrium forces equate marginal costs across
all agents with a symmetric competition. By contrast, with a heterogeneous prize function,
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marginal costs are not equated in equilibrium, and then the properties of the prize functions
can affect the inequality patterns. In our applications, such a situation arose with a two-
prize contest, or if advertising has idiosyncratic effects on the willingness-to-pay. Moreover,
the equilibrium conditions that determine consumption inequality in Section 4.2.2 are formally
equivalent to the ones generated by contests with heterogeneous prize functions, explaining why
we observe similar inequality patterns in contests with heterogeneous prize functions.
The fact that the cost functions can be decisive for the possible inequality effects induced
by level variables has specific ramifications, particularly in case of market competition. For
example, some have argued that an increasing international integration has the key effect of
increasing the total level of disposable consumer income. To explain the empirically observed
increasing inequality on the firm side associated with such changes, the literature has put forth
demand-side explanations (Mrázová and Neary, 2017), while our results emphasize a supply-side
explanation.
Our analysis of monopolistic and perfect competition reveals that an increasing disposable in-
come induces firm-side inequality effects if the firms differ in their returns to scale. This finding
is robust in thus that it arises in any type of symmetric competition. Moreover, the prediction
that growing income, or an increased industry-level productivity, leads to an increased market
concentration fits the stylized observation that “Blockbusters”, e.g., in the movie or music in-
dustry, have become more successful than ever (e.g., Elberse, 2008). Indeed, if one thinks of
media giants such as Disney or Sony, it is likely that in such industries different returns to scale
are a key aspect of the ex ante firm heterogeneity.
5 Conclusion
This article analyzes the equilibrium inequality effects that are caused by exogenous changes in
presence of ex ante heterogeneous agents. We pursue this question using a novel approach that
represents the competition the agents face as a competition for market shares. We see at least
two merits offered by this approach. First, the formulation as a competition for market shares
helps us to identify a common underlying structure in different models of competition, allowing
for a unified perspective on the causes of inequality effects. Second, the inequality tools derived
from this framework enable us to enlarge the existing knowledge about equilibrium inequality
in the context of specific applications.
Regarding the former, we show that many competition models share the formal paradigm of
a symmetric competition in thus that the marginal benefit per unit of market shares is identical
for all agents. This clarifies why these models offer conceptually identical inequality predictions.
In particular, if a market condition affects all agents identically – in which case we refer to it
as a “level variable” – then the resulting inequality effects depend exclusively on the marginal
costs of maintaining the respective market share. Such a level variable cannot induce any in-
equality effects if and only if all agents are subject to the same returns to scale in their cost
functions. By contrast, an increase in a level variable increases the polarization in the market
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share dispersion, if the agents with the largest market shares also feature the most favorable
returns to scale. The reason is that these agents can exploit their scale effects to adapt more
profitably to the new situation.
Our inequality tools provided novel insights within the context of our applications, partly be-
cause we were able to derive the inequality effects exploiting a single equilibrium equation,
rather than analyzing the full set of equilibrium equations, without relying on numerical meth-
ods, and without specifying the ex ante agent heterogeneity in full detail, e.g., in terms of a
specific, parametrized distribution.
The analytical merits of our approach perhaps are perhaps most evident in our application
to monopolistic competition. Our framework permits the inequality analysis to go substantially
beyond the standard assumption of constant marginal costs on the firm side, while remaining
analytically tractable. We establish that the ex ante dispersion of the scale effects in produc-
tion have crucial implications for the inequality effects triggered by “level” variables, such as
total income, industry-wide efficiency, or a sales tax. These variables do not affect the market
and payoff share dispersions if and only if all firms are subject to the same returns to scale in
production. By contrast, these variables induce inequality effects if firms differ in their returns
to scale – a finding, which we deem particularly relevant for industries such as movie or music.
It is well conceivable that companies as Disney or Sony feature far more favorable scale effects
than smaller studios. In such a case, our analysis predicts that a growing consumer income or
a common efficiency gain lead to quantity growth in the market paired with a rising inequality
of the firm-side market and payoff shares. Such patterns fit with empirical evidence indicat-
ing that “Blockbuster firms” have become more successful over the last decades, and generally
complements demand-side explanations for an increasing market inequality.
Besides monopolistic competition, we used our framework to study the inequality effects of
common market conditions, such as a tax, within both market sides, thereby complementing
the classical incidence literature that deals with the distribution of the tax burden between
consumers and firms. In two other applications, we explore how inequality evolves in case of
private ownership economies if consumers receive a windfall gain similar to an unconditional
basic income, or if the propensity to consume relative to enjoying leisure changes. Finally, we
also consider a set of applications inspired by IO, political economy and marketing featuring a
“competition for prize”, and highlight the key connections of such settings to our other models
of market competition.
The inequality analysis developed in this article can be extended in various directions, some of
which we already follow in our other applied work. Further, the inequality analysis may provide
a useful stepping-stone for studying normative questions related to inequality. For example, an
organizational planer may need to decide which instruments, wage schemes or prize structures
to implement for obtaining a certain distributional outcome, e.g., due to fairness considerations.
Understanding precisely the distributional consequences, say, of various policy instruments most
likely constitutes a central milestone in dealing with such issues. Finally, the fact that on most
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occasions we were able to describe the inequality effects without specifying details of the ex-ante
heterogeneity can be of interest to empirical work, as real-world agents barely are symmetric,
but the precise extent of the heterogeneity may be unknown to an econometrician.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 We first prove that p(i) > (≥)p(j) if j > i. Let p > 0 and note
that p(i) R p ⇔ g(i, p, T ) R ϕ(i, p, T ) because, by strong quasiconcavity (A1), g(i, ·, T ) must
intersect ϕ(i, ·, T ) from above at p(i) (see Figure 3, Appendix 3, for an illustration). Further,
in equilibrium
g(i, p(j), T ) > (≥)g(j, p(j), T ) = ϕ(j, p(j), T ) > (≥)ϕ(i, p(j), T ) (36)
By Assumption 2 and (5). Hence g(i, p(j), T ) ≥ ϕ(i, p(j), T ) and thus p(i) ≥ p(j), where
these two inequalities are strict if at least one inequality in (36) is strict. It also follows that
p(i) = p(j) if all inequalities in (36) are equalities, which proves the last claim of Proposition
1. Let B(i, p, T ) ≡ pV (i, p, T ). The claims about payoffs holds because
Π(i) = B(i, p(i), T )− Φ(i, p(i), T )
≥ B(i, p(j), T )− Φ(i, p(j), T ) > (≥)B(j, p(j), T )− Φ(j, p(j), T ) = Π(j),
where the first inequality follows from optimality and the second from Assumption 2. 
Proof of Lemma 1 For each i ∈ I, define z(i, p, T ;x0) ≡ g(i,p(i),T ;x0)ϕ(i,p(i),T );x0) . Thus, using short-
hand notation, (7) is z(i) = z(j). Moreover, (5) implies that z(i) = 1 ∀i in equilibrium. Total
differentiation of this equation yields
dp(i)zp(i) = dp(j)zp(j) + r, r ≡ (zT (j)− zT (i)) dT + (zx(j)− zx(i)) dx.























































(−r) = ∆jkij +Rij
which yields (9). The claims that ηi > 0 and εi < ηi follow from strong quasiconcavity (A1) in
Assumption 1. 
1
Proof of Theorem 1 We prove the first claim by contradiction. Hence suppose that R = 0
∀i, j ∈ [0, 1] and any x ∈ X, but ∃j ∈ (0, 1) such that ∆j 6= 0 (equivalently dp(j) 6= 0). Because
in equilibrium the condition ∫
∂p(s;x)
∂x
ds = 0 (38)
must hold, we can then suppose, wlog, that ∆j > 0 for some j ∈ (0, 1). By (9) we must have
∆i > 0 for all i < j, and because of (38) ∃j′ ∈ (0, 1), j′ > j, such that ∆i < 0 for all i > j′.
Take i < j and i′ > j′. Then ∆i > 0 but also ∆i = kii′∆i′ < 0, contradiction. Turning to
the second claim, note that if R 6= 0 for some i, j then ∆i = 0 ∀i ∈ [0, 1] is impossible by
(9). Hence ∀x ∈ X ∃i: ∆i(x) 6= 0, or equivalently ∂p(i;x)∂x 6= 0, and therefore ∃δ > 0 such that
p(i;x′) 6= p(i;x) for x′ ∈ (x− δ, x+ δ). 









Multiplicative separability, ϕ(i, p, T ) = u(i, p)v(T ), then implies that A(i) − A(j) = 0, and
thus Rij = 0 ∀i, j by (10). This shows that x is inequality preserving by Theorem 1. For the
converse, we need that Rij = 0 ∀x ∈ X if x is inequality preserving by Theorem 1. Thus, as
T ′(x) 6= 0, we must have that A(i) = A(j) ∀i, j or, equivalently, that ϕT (i,p,T )ϕ(i,p,T ) = h(T ) ∀i, p, T .
Integrating this equation with respect to T shows that then ϕ(i, p, T ) must be of the form
ϕ(i, p, T ) = u(i, p)v(T ). 
Proof of Corollary 2 If Φ(i, t) = c(i)tγ , then ϕ(i, p(i), T ) = γc(i)p(i)γ−1T γ in the trans-
formed model, showing the multiplicative separability of ϕ(i) in (i, p) and T , and the first claim
follows from Corollary 1. For the converse, note that
ϕ(i) ≡ ∂Φ(i, p(i)T )
∂p(i)
= h(i, p(i)T )T,










where ht denotes the partial derivative with respect to the 2nd argument of h(i, ·). If the level
variable x is inequality preserving, then R = 0 everywhere by Theorem 1. Because x is a
level variable and T ′(x) 6= 0, Rij = 0 necessarily requires that ϕT (i)ϕ(i) =
ϕT (j)
ϕ(j) by (10). But the
last equation is equivalent to ht(i,t(i))t(i)h(i,t(i)) =
ht(j,t(j))t(j)




must be equal to a fixed constant χ, ∀i. But this implies that h(i, t(i)) must be of the form
h(i, t(i)) = w(i)t(i)χ, and the fact that
∫
h(i, t)dt = Φ(i, t) gives Φ(i, t(i)) = w(i)χ+1 t(i)
χ+1, proving
the second claim. 
Proof of Theorem 2 Step 1: We prove the first claim, restricting attention to the OR-
case (the IR-case is similar). Because R(x0) is uniformly positive, ∃i ∈ (0, 1): ∆i(x0) > 0 by
the proof of Theorem 1. By the integral condition (38), there then must also be i′ ∈ (0, 1):
∆i′(x0) < 0. It then follows from (9) that i0 = sup{i ∈ [0, 1] : ∆i(x0) > 0} ∈ (0, 1), i1 = inf{i ∈
[0, 1] : ∆i(x0) < 0} ∈ (0, 1) and i0 ≤ i1. For any i < i0: ∆i(x0) > 0 and hence ∂p(i;x0)∂x > 0. This
derivative condition implies that ∀i < i0 ∃δi > 0: p(i;x) > p(i;x0) ∀x ∈ (x0, x0 + δi).
Step 2: Because p(·;x) is Class I, there is a finite number of equivalence classes to the left of
i0, and we only need to consider a single i, with corresponding δi, for each step of p(·;x) to the
left of i0. Let δ
0 > 0 be the smallest value of these δi. We have thus shown that ∃ i0 ∈ (0, 1)
such that for any given x ∈ (x0, x0 +δ0) we have p(i;x) > p(i;x0) for i < i0. A similar argument
shows that we can find δ1 > 0 such that ∃ i1 ∈ (0, 1) such that p(i;x) < p(i;x0) for i > i1 and
any x ∈ (x0, x0 + δ1). Let δ ≡ min{δ0, δ1} > 0. Summarizing, the arguments so far show that
∃i0, i1 ∈ (0, 1), i0 ≤ i1 such that for x ∈ (x0, x0 + δ) we have p(i;x) > p(i;x0) for i < i0 and
p(i;x) < p(i;x0) for i > i1. If ∆i 6= 0 for any i ∈ (i0, i1] we must have i0 = i1 and the proof
is complete. Now suppose that ∃m ∈ (i0, i1]: ∆m(x0) = 0. Then (9) implies that ∆i > 0 for
any m B i, and ∆j < 0 for any j Bm. But this shows that there can be at most one step of
p(·;x) for which ∆m(x0) = 0. It follows that independent of whether p(m;x′) >=< p(m;x) for
x ∈ (x0, x0 + δ), p(·;x′) must be OR of p(·;x0).
We now prove the second claim. By step 1 and the global uniform positivity of R, we must
have ∆0(x) > 0 and thus
∂p(0;x)
∂x > 0 for any x > x0 (note that this result is valid also if p(·)
is of Class II), hence p(i;x′) > p(i;x0) ∀i ∈ [0]. Similarly, ∆1(x) < 0 for all x > x0, hence
p(i;x′) < p(i;x0) ∀i ∈ [1]. 
Proof of Corollary 3 In text. 
Proof of Corollary 4 In text. 
Proof Lemma 2 u′v ≥ uv′ hence also u′v − uv ≥ uv′ − uv or u′ − u ≥ uv (v
′ − v) > v′ − v. 
Proof of Theorem 3 We only prove the OR case, and show that (16) implies condition (15).
Noting the equivalence between (16’) and (16), we define f(x; i, j) ≡ p(i;x)p(j;x) . If p(·) is Class II and
3
(16’) is satisfied, then f(x; i, j) > f(x0; i, j) whenever x > x0, and the claim follows from the
fact that condition (15) induces a monotonic rotation. If p(·) is Class I, then p(·;x) is piecewise
constant for any given x ∈ X, with a finite number of downward jumps. If (16’) is satisfied for
any two i, j ∈ (0, 1) with j B i that are not discontinuities of p(·;x), then f(x; i, j) > f(x0; i, j)
follows for any such i, j and any x > x0, proving the claim also for Class I densities. 
Proof of Corollary 5 Define dp(i;x) ≡ ∂p(i;x)∂x . If x is inequality preserving, then we must


















= 0 , ∀i, j ∈ I and ∀x ∈ X whenever x is inequality





= 0 ∀i, j ∈ I and ∀x ∈ X applies.
Then, (40) implies that dp(i;x)p(i;x) = k(x) > 0 ∀i ∈ I, or equivalently dp(i;x) = k(x)p(i;x). Because
p(·;x) is a density, it follows that
∫
I dp(s;x)ds = 0 as well as
∫
I p(s;x)ds = 1. Integrating
dp(i;x) = k(x)p(i;x) on both sides delivers that k(x) = 0, which assures that dp(i;x) = 0
∀i ∈ I and any x ∈ X, meaning that x must be inequality preserving. 
Proof of Proposition 2 We only prove the first claim as the remaining claims are proved
identically. Recall from the equivalence class argument in step 2 of the proof of Theorem 2 that,
because R is uniformly positive, there is a finite number of leading agents with ∆i(x0) > 0,
possibly a single ∆m(x0) = 0 and a finite number of weaker agents with ∆j(x0) < 0. Define
f(i, j, x) = p(i,x)p(j,x) . If ∆i′(x0) ≥ 0 then any i with i
′ B i has ∆i(x0) > ∆i′(x0) by (9) and
the fact that kij ≥ 1. Hence we must have ∂f(i,i
′,x0)
∂x > 0. If ∆i′(x0) < 0 but ∆i(x0) > 0,
then obviously ∂f(i,i
′,x0)
∂x > 0 Thus for any pair (i, i
′) as described above ∃δi,i′ > 0 such that
f(i, i′, x′) > f(i, i′, x0) for all x
′ ∈ (x0, x0 + δi,i′). The proof is completed by letting δ > 0 be
the smallest among these (finitely many) δi,i′ and δ
0, δ1 as in the proof of Theorem 2. 
Proof of Theorem 4 The claim follows from Theorem 3 because, by (9), if R(x) is globally
uniformly positive (negative) and k = 1, then ∆i(x) > (<)∆j(x), for any j B i and any x ∈ X,
and hence condition (16) holds. 
Proof of Corollary 6 Let jBi and T ′(x) > 0. The claims follow from noting that Rij > (<)0
⇔ ψ(j) > (<)ψ(i) ⇔ kij > (<)1. 
4
Proof of Corollary 7 Because g(i) and ϕ(i) both are multiplicatively separable in i, p and
(T, x), ε(i) and η(i) in (8) must be independent of i, and thus k = 1 uniformly by (9). Because
R > (<)0 uniformly if γi < (>)γj by Corollary 3, the claim follows from Theorem 4. 
Proof of Proposition 3 (19) implies that ηi, εi both are invariant to the agent index i; hence
kij = 1 for all i, j ∈ I follows from (9). The remaining claim follows directly from Theorem 4.

Proof of Proposition 4 Recall from Section 3.2.4 that if h(i;x) is a decreasing density with
support I, then x is inequality preserving iff the ratio h(i;x)h(j;x) is invariant to x for all i, j ∈ I, and
2). Further, x induces a monotonic OR (IR) of h(·;x) whenever the ratio h(i;x)h(j;x) has a strictly
positive x-derivative (Theorem 3).
Next, note that the ratio in (20) is of the form p(i)p(j) = (m(i, j, x)v(i, j, x))
1
β−α , wherem(i, j, x) ≡
ĝ(i,T ;x)
ĝ(j,T ;x) and v(i, j, x) ≡
ϕ̂(j,T )
ϕ̂(i,T ) . Denoting partial derivatives with respect to x as dm(i, j, x) and
dv(i, j, x), respectively, it follows that ∂∂x
p(i)




v(i,j,x) > 0. Further, (22)




m(i, j, x)βv(i, j, x)α
) 1
β−α , and ∂∂x
s(i)
s(j) > 0 iff
β dm(i,j,x)m(i,j,x) + α
dv(i,j,x)
v(i,j,x) > 0. Now, if ĝ(i, T ;x) actually is invariant to the agent index i, ceteris
paribus, then m(i, j, x) = 1. Thus dm(i, j, x) = 0 in this case and the claim in Proposition 4.
The same argument proves the claim if instead ϕ̂(i, T ) is invariant to i. The remaining claim
follows directly from the above derivations as well. 
Proof of Lemma 3 For the first claim, to see the “if” (the “only if” is obvious), suppose
by contradiction that, wlog, there is i for which p(i) > s(i). But because p(i)s(i) =
p(j)
s(j) ∀j 6= i,
it follows that also p(j) > s(j) ∀j 6= i, which is impossible as both densities must integrate to
one. Next, suppose that s(i)s(j) >
p(i)
p(j) ∀j B i. Because s(·) and p(·) both are densities with the
same support and the same equivalence classes [i], it follows by the the logic of Proposition B.1
(Appendix B.4.1) and Defintion 9 that s(·) must be a monotonic OR of p(·) (and similar for
the IR case). 
Proof of Proposition 5 The fact that I, θ and r are inequality preserving is stated in the















Note that pi > pj for any jB i as wi is increasing over agent types. (41) yields the 3rd column of
Table 1, which implies the 1st column by Theorem 3 and Corollary 5. Note that in equilibrium
5





, which directly gives the fourth column of Table 1 and, by
integration, also the last column. For payoff shares, note that ΠiΠj =
pi
pj
= sisj , which assures that




















and the fifth column follows from differentiating this expression. Finally, the Power Law prop-
erty assures that all rotations must be monotonic by Proposition 3. 
Proof of Proposition 6 Let j B i, such that γj > γi. Evaluating (10) for (27) gives






, j B i, (42)
Further, (27) implies that ∂p(i;T )∂θ > 0 and
∂p(i;T )
∂T < 0 for any fixed T > 0, which assures that
T ′(θ) > 0 by the procedure in Section 3.3. This jointly with (42) shows that Rij is uniformly































Because dθ > 0 implies dT > 0 and triggers an OR, (43) implies that dqi > 0 at least for some
i and, because of (45) dqi > 0 must apply ∀i ∈ [0, 1]. Because θ does not enter (45) directly
and γj > γi, the fact dqi > 0 ∀i implies that also the ratio qiqj must increase for any given






, showing that also the ratio pipj increases,











in equilibrium, which shows that relative prices must also
increase. We now show that d(piT ) > 0, which implies that all prices Pi must decrease. By
(43), the fact that dqi > 0 implies η∆i +
dT
T > 0 ∀i ∈ I, and hence also d(piT ) > 0 (recall that
T ′(θ) > 0).
52Recall that we assume parameters to be such that qi > 1 ∀i.
6





, showing that Πi qualitatively behaves like
pi as θ changes. Because p(·) displays an OR, this further implies that winners and losers




does so as well. Let vi ≡ (γi−1)η+1γiη and note that vi is strictly increasing over agent types.
Aggregate payoff then is Π(θ) =
∫
psvsIds. Because dθ > 0 induces an OR, there is i0 ∈ (0, 1)
such that dpi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ (0, i0) and dpi < 0 ∀i ∈ (i0, 1), where
∫ i0









dpsvsds, and the claim that Π













Finally, payoff shares are si =
Πi










which by Theorem 3 assures that s(·) displays a monotonic OR. 
Proof of Proposition 7 Let jB i. Using the procedure outlined in Section 3.3, it is straight-
forward to verify that T ′(I) < 0. Then (44) implies that dqi > 0 ∀i ∈ [0, 1] for dI > 0. Because
I does not enter (45) directly and γj > γi, the fact that dqi > 0 ∀i ∈ I further implies that the
ratio qiqj strictly increases for dI > 0. Therefore, (43) assures that also
pi
pj
increases for dI > 0






profits increase in I, and because piT = P
1−η
i so do relative prices
Pj
Pi
. Finally, the fact that
pi
pj
increases also assures that s(i)s(j) must increase, which implies that s(·) must also display a
monotonic OR by Theorem 3. 
Proof of Proposition 8 Applying the procedure from Section 3.3 shows that T ′(x) > 0
because PT (T ;x) < 0, Px(T ;x) > 0 and ϕq(i, q) > 0 by strict convexity. Then, the first claim
follows from Corollary 2, and the last claim from Corollary 6. Regarding the effect of x on P
and qi, note that as T
′(x) > 0 we must have q′i(x) > 0 for some i. But because in equilibrium
also ϕ(i, qi) = ϕ(j, qj) by (29), strict convexity implies that q
′
i(x) > 0 ∀i. Moreover, (29) then
also implies that dP = PT (T (x);x)T
′(x) + Px(T (x);x) > 0, proving the remaining claim. 
Proof of Proposition 9 Let j B i, and note that Πi = piTP (T ;x)
ψi−1
ψi






ψi−1 . This shows that
pi
pj
= sisj ∀i, j if and only if ψj = ψi ∀i, j, meaning that costs must be
of the form Φ(i, q) = ciq




if and only if ψj < (>)ψi. But if
pi
pj
< (>) sisj ∀i, j, then s(·) must be a monotonic OR (IR) of
p(·) by Lemma 3. Finally, the Envelope Theorem implies that Π′i(x) = (PT (T ;x)T ′(x)+Px)piT ,




∀i, and Π′i(x)−Π′j(x) = (PT (T ;x)T ′(x) + Px)(pi − pj)T > 0 whenever j B i. 
Proof of Corollary 8 The first claim follows because, by Proposition 9, si = pi ∀i if and
only if costs verify Φ(i, q) = ciq
γ , ∀i ∈ I, where the latter requirement again is equivalent to x
being inequality preserving by Proposition 8. The second claim follows because, by Proposition
8, dx > 0 induces an OR (IR) of p(·) whenever ψj > (<)ψi ∀j B i, and the latter condition is
equivalent to s(·) being a monotonic OR (IR) of p(·) by Proposition 9. 
Proof of Proposition 10 Note first that P ′(τ) < 0 and T ′(τ) > 0.53 Then, the equilibrium
condition P (τ)+τ = ϕ(i, piT ) has the form of (29), meaning that Propositions 8-9 and Corollary
8 apply. On the consumer-side, P (τ) = v(ic, p
d
ic
T ) shows that τ is a level variable with T ′(τ) > 0.
Thus τ is inequality preserving if and only if V (ic, q) = αicq
µ ∀ic by Corollary 2, and the second
claim follows from Corollary 4. 
Proof of Proposition 11 The firm-side equilibrium condition (5) is P = ϕ(i, piT ), and hence
identical to the one from Section 4.2.1. Aggregation yields T =
∫
ϕ−1(i, P )di, and T ′(P ) > 0
because ϕq(i, q) > 0. T




T (P ) + PT ′(P )−Π′(P )
follows. Hotelling’s Lemma shows that Π′(P ) =
∫
∂PΠidi = T . Therefore P
′(ω) > 0, and
T ′(ω) > 0, as well as Π′(ω) = Π′(P )P ′(ω) > 0. Because T ′(ω) > 0 and dω has the effect of a
level variable for firms, the firm-side inequality must be as in Proposition 10.
On the consumer-side, (31) implies that the ratio pdic/p
d
ic








, Π′(ω) ≡ Π′(P )P ′(ω). (46)




ω. Therefore dω > 0 induces a monotonic IR of pd(·) by Theorem 3.
(ii) Using ωic = ω ∀ic in (46) shows that pdic/p
d
jc
increases (decreases) in ω if Π′(ω) > Π(ω)/ω.
Because Π′(ω) > 0 and Π(0) = 0, it follows that Π′(ω) > (<)Π(ω)/ω holds if Π(ω) is strictly
convex (concave). Thus, if Π(ω) is strictly convex, dω > 0 induces a monotonic OR. 
Proof of Proposition 12 Note that α and θ are inequality preserving for firms. Equilibrium
profits are Πi = piT
γ−1




γ . The equilibrium
53Formally, T =
∫
ϕ−1(i, P + τ)di ≡ T (P, τ), and T d =
∫
v−1(ic, P )dic ≡ T d(P ), where TP (P, τ) > 0,
Tτ (P, τ) > 0 and T
d
P (P ) < 0. Because T = T (P, τ) = T
d(P ) = T d we have P ′(τ) < 0, and thus T ′(τ) > 0.
8
equation determining consumer market shares (TD = T ) is α(w + Sic) = p
d
ic
T ; hence T =

















Equations (47), (48) imply that w′(α) < 0, T ′(α) > 0, w′(θ) > 0 and T ′(θ) > 0. Moreover, also
∂Πi
∂α > 0, and hence Π
′(α) > 0 and thus
∂Sic
∂α > 0 (provided that sic > 0). Because aggregate
output T increases so must aggregate labor supply. To prove the claimed monotonic OR of pdic
for dα > 0, it suffices to show that pdic/p
d
jc


















This together with the fact that w′(α) < 0 and
∂Sic
∂α > 0 implies that
pdic
pdjc
increases in α, proving
the OR of pd(·) in α. Moreover, because qdic = p
d
ic
T this further assures also that qic/qjc and
fic/fjc increase in α. It now immediately follows that dqic > dqjc if dqic > 0. For dθ > 0, (47)




w(θ) , which shows that relative income increases at the same rate
for all consumers. Thus, θ must be inequality preserving. 
Proof of Proposition 13 See main text. 
Proof of Proposition 14 It is easy to see that T ′(x) > 0 using the procedure from Section
3.3, and the first claim follows from Corollary 2. With respect to p(·), the second claim follows
from Theorem 3 noting that pi/pj = (Vi/Vj)
1
γ−1 As equilibrium profits are Πi = piVi
γ−1
γ ,
it follows that sisj is of the form (22), and the claimed inequality effects of s(·) follow from
Proposition 4. The last claim follows from Lemma 3 as s(i)/s(j) > p(i)/p(j). 
Proof of Proposition 15 We prove the claim by applying Lemma 1. First, we note that
kmn = 1 ∀m,n ∈ [0, 1]. Second, we note that Rmn = 0 whenever m,n 6= i, and Rij = dViVi > 0
whenever jBi, while Rji = −dViVi < 0 whenever iBj. These facts imply that ∆m = ∆n whenever
m,n 6= i. We now prove that ∆i > 0 and ∆j < 0 ∀j 6= i. By contradiction, suppose that ∆j ≥ 0
for some j 6= i. Then actually ∆j > 0 for all j 6= i. Because market shares must integrate to
9
unity, it follows that ∆i < 0, which is impossible because ∆i = ∆j +Rij > 0. We conclude that
∆i > 0 while ∆j < 0 ∀j 6= i, which further implies that only the market share of i increases.
The claimed proportionality in the decreasing market shares of the other agents follows directly
from ∆m = ∆n, m,n 6= i. 
Proof of Proposition 16 The equilibrium condition (5) is
g(i) ≡ V1 + (1− 2pi)V2 = cipη−1i T
η ≡ ϕ(i). (49)
By Proposition B.2 (Appendix B.4.2) the marginal change dV1, dV2 causes an OR (IR) of p(·) if
z(p) ≡ dV1 + (1− 2p)dV2
V1 + (1− 2p)V2
verifies z′(p) > (<)0. The first claim follows from sign(z′(p)) = sign (dV1V2 − dV2V1). Likewise,
Proposition B.2 (Appendix B.4.2) says that Rij = 0 uniformly if z
′(p) = 0, which yields the
second claim. The last claim follows from observing that dwi = 2dpi(1 − 2pi), showing that if
pi < 1/2 ∀i, then wi must behave like pi (as sign dwi = sign dpi). 
Proof of Proposition 17 The equilibrium equation is
g(i) ≡ 2αpiT + β = γcipγ−1i T
γ ≡ ϕ(i). (50)
We first use the procedure in Section 3.3 to determine the sign of T ′(α). Implicit differentiation
of (50) for given T > 0 shows that
pT (i;T ) = −
gT (i)− ϕT (i)
gp(i)− ϕp(i)
= − 2αpi(1− γ)− βγ/T
2αT (2− γ)− β(γ − 1)T/pi
< 0
The same type of calculation shows that pα(i;T, α) > 0, which allows us to conclude that
T ′(α) > 0 by the procedure in Section 3.3. To prove the claimed OR, we show that R > 0












it is easily verified that A(i)−A(j) > 0 proving that R > 0 uniformly.
We now show that R < 0 uniformly for dγ > 0. We first show that T ′(γ) < 0. We have







γ (1 + γLn(pi) + γLn(T ))
2αT (2− γ)− β(γ − 1)T/pi
,
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and thus pγ(i;T ) < 0 if 1 + γLn(pi) + γLn(T ) < 0, where the last inequality holds as pi = ti/T
and ti > 1 by presumption. Together with pT (i;T ) < 0 this shows that T
′(γ) < 0 by the
procedure in Section 3.3. To prove that R < 0, we need to verify that A(i) − A(j) < 0. But
as
gγ(i)




g(i) are strictly increasing over agent types,
R < 0 follows from T ′(γ) < 0, which proves the second claim. 
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B Supplement
Section B.1 proves the equivalence between the equilibria where agents compete directly for
market shares or indirectly via choosing their actions. Section B.2 establishes the existence of a
unique equilibrium given Assumption 1. Section B.3 elaborates on the continuum representation
for atomistic agents. Section B.4 contains additional technical results on rotations. Finally,
Section B.5 demonstrates how to adopt the formal analysis to study inequality in the Nash
equilibrium of aggregative games.
B.1 Equivalence of equilibria
We show that the model, where the agents optimize (2) by choosing t(i) yields the same equilibria
as the model, where agents optimize (4) by directly choosing their market shares. For simplicity,
we refer to the model with payoff (2) as the “original model”, and to the model with payoff (4)
as the “transformed model”. Recall that an equilibrium of the original model is given by (t, T ),
where t is the equilibrium action profile, such that t(i) is the optimal action for each i ∈ I, and
T = Z(t). The following theorem shows that under the assumptions made, any equilibrium
(t, T ) of the original model corresponds to an equilibrium (p, T ) of the transformed model, and
vice-versa.
Theorem B.1 Suppose that (3) holds, and the market share function p(i, ·, T ) is bijective for
any given i ∈ I and any T ∈ R+.
1) If (t, T ) is an equilibrium of the original model and a function p : I → R+ is defined by
p(i) = p(i, t(i), T ), then (p, T ) is an equilibrium in the transformed model.
2) If (p, T ) is an equilibrium of the transformed model and t(i) = p−1(i, p(i), T ) for each
i ∈ I, then (t, T ) is an equilibrium in the original model.
Proof: Recall the notational convention that we write Π
(
i, p−1(i, p(i), T ), T
)
≡ Π (i, p(i), T )
for the payoff function where t(i) has been replaced by the unique corresponding value p(i),
instead of using a separate symbolic notation Π, Π̂ to explicitly distinguish between Π(i, t(i), T )
and Π̂(i, p(i), T ). In particular, this means that Π(i, t(i), T ) = Π(i, p(i), T ) whenever p(i) =
p(i, t(i), T ) or likewise t(i) = p−1(i, p(i), T ).
1) If (t, T ) is an equilibrium, then T = Z(t) and for each i ∈ I, t(i) maximizes (2). Let p(i) ≡
p(i, t(i), T ) denote the market shares induced by (t, T ). Suppose now that (p, T ) as constructed
in the Theorem is not an equilibrium of the transformed model. Because
∫ 1
0 p(i)di = 1 by (3),
there then must be p̃(i) 6= p(i) such that Π(i, p̃(i), T ) > Π(i, p(i), T ) for some i ∈ I. Because
1
t̃(i) = p−1(i, p̃(i), T ) 6= t(i) = p−1(i, p(i), T ) this likewise implies that Π(i, t̃(i), T ) > Π(i, t(i), T )
in the original model, contradicting the optimality of t for all i ∈ I.
2) Let (p, T ) be an equilibrium of the transformed model, with market shares p(i) ∈ R+.
Consider the action profile t defined by t(i) = p−1(i, p(i), T ), i ∈ I. Because market shares




0 p(i, t(i), T )di, also
Z(t) = T by (3). Now, suppose that (t, T ) is not an equilibrium of the original model. Then,
there is t̃(i) 6= t(i) such that Π(i, t̃(i), T ) > Π(i, t(i), T ) for some i ∈ I. Setting p̃(i) ≡ p(i, t̃(i), T )
for these i ∈ I then implies that Π(i, p̃(i), T ) > Π(i, p(i), T ), contradicting optimality of p(i) in
the transformed model. 
B.2 Equilibrium existence and uniqueness
Assumptions 1-2 ascertain the existence of a unique equilibrium (p(i), T ).
Theorem B.2 (Existence and uniqueness) Any model with payoffs (4) that satisfy As-
sumptions 1 and 2 has a unique equilibrium (p(i), T ). All equilibrium payoffs Π(i) are positive,
and p(·) is a bounded, decreasing and strictly positive density.
The proof evolves in two steps, reflecting the two requirements in the equilibrium definition. Its















𝑔𝑔(𝑖𝑖, 0,𝑇𝑇)  
Figure 3: Equilibrium existence and uniqueness
exists for any given T > 0 and any fixed i ∈ [0, 1]. This follows because a zero market share is
not optimal (g(i, 0, T ) > 0 = ϕ(i, 0, T )), the gains from increasing one’s market share are limited
(g(·, T ) bounded from above) and marginal costs are strictly increasing in p(i) and unbounded.
Uniqueness of this optimizer is implied by strong quasiconcavity. (A2) then assures that there is
a unique T > 0 such that
∫
p(i;T )di = 1. To see why, suppose that g(i, p, T ) is bounded above
and away from 0 for any p ≥ 0 and any T > 0, consistent with (but stronger than) assumption
(A2). Even the best agent (i = 0) then seeks to make her market share p(i;T ) arbitrarily small
2
because as T → ∞ marginal costs become arbitrarily large. Similarly, even the worst agent
(i = 1) aims at an arbitrarily large p(i;T ) if T → 0 and marginal costs become arbitrarily small.
These two facts imply that lim
T→∞
∫
p(i;T )di = 0 and lim
T→0
∫
p(i;T )di = ∞, and existence of a
T > 0 with
∫
p(i, T )di = 1 follows by continuity of
∫
p(i; ·)di. Uniqueness then follows from the
last assumption in (A2), which assures that
∫
p(i; ·)di is strictly decreasing at
∫
p(i, T )di = 1.
Proof of Theorem B.2 The proof consists of two steps. i) Fix i ∈ [0, 1] and T > 0 arbitrarily.
(A1) assures that the equation (5) has a unique solution p(i;T ) > 0, and that this solution
indeed maximizes (4) given T . Now, consider the function p(i, T ) ≡ p(i;T ), noting that p(i, ·) is
a strictly decreasing C1-function on (0,∞) as a consequence of the Implicit Function Theorem,
the strong quasiconcavity assumption in (A1), and the last assumption of (A1). Moreover,
p(·, T ) must be a decreasing function by Assumption 2 and, hence, p(·, T ) is integrable over
[0, 1], so let G(T ) ≡
∫ 1
0 p(i, T )di, noting that G is differentiable. ii) We show: ∃! T > 0:
G(T ) = 1. Fix i ∈ [0, 1]. By (A2) there must exist Ti > 0: g(i, 1, Ti) = ϕ(i, 1, Ti). Therefore,
∃T0 > 0 such that p(0, T0) = 1. Because p(i, ·) strictly decreasing, it follows that p(0;T ) < 1
for T > T0. Since p(·, T ) is decreasing, we must have p(i, T ) < 1 for any i ∈ [0, 1] and T > T0,
which implies that lim
T→∞
G(T ) < 1. Similarly, it follows that ∃T1 > 0 such that p(1;T1) = 1.
Thus p(i, T1) > 1 for i ∈ [0, 1] and T < T1, hence lim
T→0
G(T ) > 1. As G(·) continuous, ∃T > 0
such that G(T ) = 1, and uniqueness follows from the fact that, for each i ∈ [0, 1], p(i;T ) and
hence G(T ) is strictly decreasing in T . Finally, Π(i) > 0, because p(i) = p(i;T ) > 0 is the
unique maximizer and Π(i)|p(i)=0 = 0. 
B.3 Continuum representation for atomistic agents
We illustrate that the equilibrium distribution in case of n ∈ N atomistic (“discrete”) agents
can be identified with our finite step density model. The following argument considers the
case, where heterogeneity enters the model through a cost coefficient function as in (6). This
should suffice to make evident that the representation result applies similarly to other cases as
well. Consider a population consisting of n ∈ N atomistic (or “discrete”) agents, indexed by
{1/n, 2/n, ..., 1}. Suppose that the agents differ in their cost coefficient c(i), i ∈ {1/n, 2/n, ..., 1}.
Then, the agents can be partitioned into 1 ≤ K ≤ n groups of identical agents, with group size
nk,
∑
k nk = n. This partition gives 1 ≤ K ≤ n equivalence classes (groups) of sizes n1, ..., nK ,∑
k nk = n. We identify each group by a “representative” agent ik. In equilibrium every




d(i/n) = 1. Let p(i) denote the (step) density function that characterizes our
(continuum) equilibrium from definition 1 with the corresponding cost step function c(i) = c(ik)
3
on [ik, ik+1), and group measures γ1, ..., γK satisfying γk = nk/n. We now establish the formal





the equilibrium step density p(i).
Theorem B.3 (Continuum Representation) Let n ∈ N and suppose that agents are par-




corresponds to the discrete equilibrium and p(i) is
the equilibrium (step) density of the respective continuum problem, then pd(i/n) = 1np(i/n) is
satisfied for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}
Proof: In the continuum case we only have to solve the optimization problem for a represen-






d(ik)nk. The claim now
is that 1np(ik) = p

















the claim follows from the uniqueness of equilibrium. 
Hence the continuum step-function case and the atomistic case are equivalent up to the
multiplicative constant 1/n (independent of group composition), which means that we can
work with either model, and justifies our procedure of the main text. It then also follows that
p(ik)γk = p
d(ik)nk corresponds to the market share of a member of group k, illustrating why
we used the notion of a “representative” agent.
Because Theorem B.3 remains valid as n grows arbitrarily large, this provides the following
justification for using strictly increasing cost coefficient functions (Class II) as an approximation
for the case of many different agents. Suppose that c(i) is a Class II function defined on [0, 1]
(e.g., c(i) = 1+i), and let p(i) = p(c(i)) denote the corresponding equilibrium density (a strictly
decreasing, continuous function). Then, because c(i) is continuous on a compact interval, for
n ∈ N the sequence of step functions defined by cn(i) = c(i) if i ∈ {0, 1/n, 2/n, ..., 1} and cn(i) =
c(s/n) for i ∈ (s/n, (s + 1)/n), s ∈ {0, 1, ..., n − 1}, converges (uniformly) to c(i) as n → ∞.54
Consider the atomistic equilibrium distribution pd(i/n) induced by c(0), c(1/n), c(2/n), ..., c(1).
By Theorem B.3, npd(i/n) = p(i/n), where p(i/n) is the step-density version of pd(i/n). More
precisely, for a given n ∈ N this density is a decreasing finite step function with pn(i) = p(cn(i)),
where cn(i) is as defined above. Because cn(i) → c(i) and p(i) is continuous, we have p(i) =
p(c(i)) = p(lim cn(i)) = lim p(cn(i)) = lim pn(i). This shows that while, of course, the atomistic
pd(i/n) becomes arbitrarily close to zero as n grows large, the “scaled” distribution law as
captured by the step-density version p(i/n) approaches p(i).
54Such approximations of continuous functions by a sequence of step functions are a standard result in real
analysis and integration theory.
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B.4 Rotations: Further Results
B.4.1 Ratio Test
We prove that condition (15) from Section 3.2.2 indeed implies a rotation of p(·).
Proposition B.1 Suppose that ∞ > p(·;x′), p(·;x) > 0 are right-continuous, decreasing SSD
densities with similar equivalence classes [i]. If (15) holds, then p(·;x′) is an OR (IR) of p(·;x).
Proof: Let g(i) ≡ p(i;x
′)
p(i;x) . Because p(·;x
′) and p(·;x) both are SSD densities with similar
equivalence classes, (15) implies that g(·) is not constant on (0, 1): ∃i0 ∈ (0, 1) such that g(i) >
g(j), i < i0 ≤ j. Further, g(·) is right-continuous, and by (15) also decreasing. We first claim
that g(0) > 1. Suppose, by contradiction, that g(0) ≤ 1. Then g(i) ≤ 1, i ∈ I, and additionally





p(s;x)ds, contradiction. Therefore g(0) > 1; a similar argument shows
that g(1) < 1. Because g(0) > 1 and g(·) is right-continuous, the set {i : g(i) > 1, i > 0} is
non-empty, and we let i0 ≡ sup{i > 0 : g(i) > 1}, noting that i0 ∈ (0, 1). Because g decreases
and g(1) < 1, the set {i : g(i) < 1, i ≥ i0} is non-empty, and we set i1 ≡ inf{i ≥ i0 : g(i) < 1}.
If i0 = i1, then p(i;x
′) > p(i;x) on (0, i0), and p(i;x
′) < p(i;x) > 0 on (i0, 1]. If i0 < i1 then
g(i) = 1 on (i0, i1). These facts together imply that p(·;x′) is OR of p(·;x); the case on an IR
is proved similarly. 
B.4.2 On the Direct-Aggregative Effect
By Theorems 1 and 2, the sign of the direct-aggregative effect is crucial for studying the inequal-
ity effects. In this section we search for the determinants of sign(Rij) in terms of primitives.
We concentrate on the multiplicatively separate case where ϕ(i) = ϕ(i, p)C(T ) as many of our
applications feature such a cost function.
Proposition B.2 Let ϕ(i) = ϕ(i, p)C(T ), and define h(i, p, T ;x) = Ln (g(i, p, T ;x)). If
hx(i, p, T ;x0) ≥ hx(j, p, T ;x0), hT (i, p, T ;x0) ≥ hT (j, p, T ;x0) ∀j B i,
hT (i, p
′, T ;x0) ≥ hT (i, p, T ;x0), hx(i, p′, T ;x0) ≥ hx(i, p, T ;x0) ∀i and any p′ > p,
where at least one of the above inequalities is strict, then R is uniformly positive at x0. If all
inequalities are reversed (and one strict so), then R is uniformly negative at x0. Finally, if all
inequalities are equalities, then R is uniformly zero at x0.
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Proof: We only prove the uniformly positive case (the negative case is established by the same







we have A(i) > A(j) whenever j B i. So take any j B i. First, hT (i, p′, T ;x0) ≥ hT (i, p, T ;x0)
and hT (i, p, T ;x0) ≥ hT (j, p, T ;x0) yield
hT (i, p(i), T ;x0) ≥ hT (i, p(j), T ;x0) ≥ hT (j, p(j), T ;x0)





T ′(x) ≥ gT (j)
g(j)
T ′(x),
where the inequality is strict, whenever at least one of the initial inequalities is strict. Second,
hx(i, p, T ;x0) ≥ hx(j, p, T ;x0) and hx(i, p′, T ;x0) ≥ hx(i, p, T ;x0) yield






where, again, the inequality is strict if one of the previous inequalities is strict. This shows
that Rij(x0) > 0. Finally, is all inequalities are equalities, the condition in Proposition B.2 is
equivalent to multiplicative separability of g(i) in (i, p) and (T, x), meaning that x must be a
level variable, and the last claim follows from Corollary 1. 
Proposition B.2 contains the inequality analysis of the contest model from section 4.3 as the
special case, where marginal benefits in (5) are independent from p and T . In such a case,
Proposition B.2 tells us that only the direct effect of dx matters for the inequality effects. In
particular, incentives to increase market shares are relatively stronger for strong agent types if
and only if marginal benefits increase proportionally more for these types, i.e., iff dg(i)/g(i) >
dg(j)/g(j) holds for j B i. In the more general case, where marginal benefits depend also on
p and T , the above effect is mitigated. For example, a positive shock dx > 0 increases T by
Lemma 4, and the direct incentive effects of dx > 0 are either reinforced or weakened in response
6
to dT depending on gT .
55
As another application, suppose that marginal benefits can be written as a power function of
the form
g(i, p, T, x) = u(i)v(T ;x)pξ(T ;x),
Proposition B.2 then implies that R is determined solely by the elasticity function ξ(T, x).
In particular, R is uniformly positive if ξT , ξx ≥ (≤)0 with one strict inequality, and R = 0
uniformly if ξ is constant.
B.4.3 Equilibrium CDF
The following proposition describes the CDF F (i;x) pertaining to the equilibrium market share
function p(i;x) in greater detail, and clarifies the effects of a rotation on the ordering of the
CDF’s.
Proposition B.3 Suppose that ∀x ∈ X the decreasing density p(·;x) with support [0, 1] and
CDF F (·;x) verifies the SSD property. Then
a) F (i;x) > i, i ∈ (0, 1), x ∈ X
b) F (i;x) is strictly increasing, continuous and concave in i, x ∈ X. If p(·;x) is strictly
decreasing, then F (·;x) is strictly concave.
c) If p(i;x′) is OR of p(i;x), then F (·;x) strictly stochastically dominates F (·;x′), i.e.
F (i;x′) > F (i;x), ∀i ∈ (0, 1).
Proof a) Fix x ∈ X; hence we omit to write x in the proof of a). Consider i0 ∈ (0, 1). If
p(i0) ≥ 1, then by SSD and because p(·) is a decreasing density ∃ î < 1: p(i) < 1 on [̂i, 1]. Thus
there must also be ĩ ∈ (0, i0] such that p(i) > 1 on [0, ĩ). Hence F (i0) > i0. If p(i0) < 1 then,














0 (p(s)− 1) ds =
∫ 1
i (1− p(s)) ds >
∫ i0
i (1− p(s))ds, where the inequality follows from
the fact that 1− p(s) > 0 for s ∈ [i, 1]. Hence F (i0) > i0.
55Particularly, if gT > (<)0, then R > 0 is more likely to result if the increase (decrease) in marginal benefits
triggered by dT > 0 affects the strong agent relatively more (less).
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We now prove c), which follows from a similar argument. If i ∈ (0, i0], then p(i;x′) > p(i;x) >


















where the inequality follows from p(s;x′) = p(s;x) on (i0, i1) and p(s;x) > p(s;x
′) on (i1, 1].
Hence again F (i;x′) > F (i;x).
b) As in the proof of a) we fix x ∈ X and omit to write x in the following. The fact that
F (i) is strictly increasing in i follows directly from p(·) > 0. Let i, j ∈ [0, 1] and i < j. Let
t ∈ [0, 1]. First, note that tF (i) + (1 − t)F (j) = F (j) − t
∫ j
i p(s)ds, and F (ti + (1 − t)j) =∫ j
0 p(s)ds −
∫ j
i′ p(s)ds where i












p(s)ds ≥ 0 t ∈ (0, 1), i < i′ < j (51)
Because p(i) is decreasing, we must have p(i) ≥ p(i′) ≥ p(j) (with strict inequalities in the







p(i′)ds ≥ 0 t ∈ (0, 1)
This inequality reduces to t(i′− i)− (1− t)(j− i′) ≥ 0, which, by construction of i′, is satisfied.
This verifies the (strict) concavity of F (·), and the continuity of F (·) follows from concavity
and the fact that F (·) cannot jump at the boundary points {0, 1}. 
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B.4.4 Difference Test
We next provide an alternative sufficient condition to detect rotations. If p(·;x′) − p(·;x) is
strictly decreasing over its equivalence classes, i.e., if p(·;x′) − p(·;x) is strictly decreasing for
any two different agent types, then p(·;x′) must be an OR of p(·;x).
Proposition B.4 (Difference test) Take the presumptions of Proposition B.1 as satisfied. If
p(i;x′)− p(i;x) > (<)p(j;x′)− p(j;x) whenever j B i ∈ (0, 1) (52)
holds, then p(·;x′) is an OR (IR) of p(·;x).
Proof The proof mimics the one of Proposition B.1. Define g(i) ≡ p(i;x′)−p(i;x), and note that∫
g(s)ds = 0. Suppose that g(0) ≤ 0 By presupposition, g is decreasing, right-continuous and,
by SSD, ∃i0 ∈ (0, 1): 0 ≥ g(0) > g(i), ∀i ≥ i0. Hence
∫
g(s)ds < 0, a contradiction. Therefore
g(0) > 0, and a similar argument shows that g(1) < 0. Because g is decreasing, right-continuous
and g(0) > 0, the set {i : g(i) > 0, i > 0} is non-empty, and we let i0 = sup{i > 0 : g(i) > 0},
noting that i0 ∈ (0, 1). It follows that p(i;x′) > p(i;x) on (0, i0), and
∫ i0
0 g(s)ds > 0. Be-
cause g decreases and
∫
g(s)ds = 0, the set {i : g(i) < 0, i ≥ i0} is non-empty, and we set
i1 = inf{i ≥ i0 : g(i) < 0}. If i0 < i1 then g(i) = 0 on (i0, i1), as g is decreasing and right-
continuous. These facts together imply that p(·;x′) is OR of p(·;x). 
Like Proposition B.1, Proposition B.4 encompasses both Class I and II densities. The counter-
part of Theorem 3 is as follows.56






> 0 ∀x′ ≥ x0, (53)
∀jB i, then p(i;x′) is OR of p(i;x) whenever x′ > x0. If the inequality in (16’) is reversed, then
p(i;x′) is IR of p(i;x).
For applications, Corollary B.1 says that whenever we can deduce (53) from the equilibrium
equation (7), then the OR property follows.
Relation to submodularity If p(·; ·) is strictly submodular (or log-submodular), then (52)
(or (15)) is satisfied with “>”, but if p(·;x) is a Class I step-function, p(·; ·) is never strictly
56The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 3 and therefore omitted.
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submodular, because strict submodularity of p(·; ·) requires p(·;x′) − p(·;x) to be strictly de-
creasing for x′ > x, which obviously is violated in the step-function case (a similar argument
holds for the log-submodular case).57 This further shows that in case of Class II densities if (52)
holds for all x, x′ ∈ X with x′ > x then p(·; ·) is strictly submodular as a function. A similar
argument can be made in the supermodular case.
Relation between difference and ratio test We now discuss the formal relation between
the difference and the ratio test, and relate it to the literature. We begin by noting that in the
two-type case properties (15), (52), the rotation-property (12) and stochastic dominance of the
respective distribution functions are all equivalent (we omit the obvious proof). In the case of
just two types, suppose that the fraction of “good” (e.g., low-cost) types is γ ∈ (0, 1). Let i = 0
represent good types and i = 1 bad types. Then p(·) has the form
p(·) =
 p0 i ∈ [0, γ)p1 i ∈ [γ, 1] , p1 =
1− γp0
1− γ
, p0 ≥ p1 (54)
Proposition B.5 (Two-types case) Let x, x′ ∈ X and suppose that the densities p(·;x), p(·;x′)
are specified by (54) with distribution functions F (·;x), F (·;x′). Then properties (12), (15), (52)
and strict stochastic dominance F (i;x′) > F (i;x) are equivalent.
While the ratio test and the difference test can both be used to establish an OR or IR of p(·),
they are not equivalent in general.58
Proposition B.6 Suppose that the premise of Proposition B.1 is satisfied. If (15) is satisfied,
then (52) holds for all i for which p(i;x′) ≥ p(i;x). If (52) is satisfied, then (15) holds for all
j B i where p(i;x′) ≤ p(i;x).




p(j;x) whenever j B i. Suppose










+ 1 j B i. (55)
57Recall that for functions on R2 strict super- and submodularity are equivalent to the concept of strictly
increasing (decreasing) differences.
58The ratio condition (15) and the difference condition (52) are equivalent if p(i;x), p(i;x′) are linear in i,
which they cannot be if p(·) is of Class I.
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Now, because of (55) condition (15) is satisfied if p(j;x
′)−p(j;x)
p(i;x) + 1 ≥
p(j;x′)




p(j;x) . But this inequality must hold, because as p(i;x
′) ≤ p(i;x) (55)
implies that p(j;x′)− p(j;x) < 0. 
Proposition B.6 says that if p satisfies (52), then the ratio p(i;x)/p(j;x) increases in x on the
“loosing side” where p(i;x′) ≤ p(i;x). Conversely, if the ratio property (15) is satisfied, then
the “winning side”, where p(i;x′) ≥ p(i;x), satisfies property (52).
To place this result in the relevant mathematical context, note that if p(·; ·) were monotonic on
[0, 1]×X, then log-supermodularity of p(·; ·) would imply supermodularity, and submodularity
would imply log-submodularity (see Topkis (1998), p. 65). However, because in our context
p(i, x) generically cannot be montonic in both arguments,59 this result does not apply. In this
respect, Proposition B.6 can be viewed as an extension of the result to the case of a partially
monotone function.
B.5 Market Inequality in the Nash Equilibria of Aggregative Games
The aim of this section is to exemplify, by means of a simple application from contest theory,
that the approach of this paper can be applied to study inequality effects in aggregative games
with payoffs of the form (2). The only essential difference to the setting of the main text is that
in an aggregative game the individual agents take into account the effects of their own actions
on the aggregate in a Nash equilibrium. If the aggregate T in payoff (2) is not exogenous to
the individual player, it is not obvious whether and how our distributional tools may be used
to study the inequality effects.
We now exemplify how our approach can be adjusted to be fruitful also in this more cum-
bersome case. The way how we proceed to use our inequality tools if individual players take
into account their impact on the aggregate is general, and can be used in any other aggrega-
tive game with a differentiable structure as well. Note that there is little loss in assuming a
sum-aggregative structure of such games, because any aggregative game with a well-behaved
aggregator (differentiable and coordinate-wise strictly monotonic) is strategically equivalent to
a sum-aggregative game (Cornes and Hartley, 2012).
In Section 4.3 we analyzed a contest model under the assumption that individual agents take
the aggregate T =
∫
t(i)di as given when choosing their effort, while T was endogenous to the
model. We now study the same model, assuming that each of finitely many agent types takes its
59E.g. in the continuous case the integral condition implies the existence of at least one intersection of p(i;x)
and p(i;x′).
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V − Φ(i, ti) (56)
Define the market share pi = ti/T as before, with T ≡
∑
ts. Let Ti ≡
∑
s 6=i ts. Because
T = Ti + ti and ti = piT we obtain t(i) =
pi
1−piTi. Thus we can restate (56) in terms of own
market share as








where Ti is exogenous to player i. A Nash equilibrium is a probability vector (p1, ..., pn) and an
aggregate T > 0 such that Ti = (1− pi)T and p(i) maximizes (56’).60 Thus, any interior Nash





Because (57) is of the form (5), we can apply the inequality tools from Section 3 as they are to
study the inequality effects as we did in the main text.61
One question of self-interest is whether the inequality predictions are sensitive to the change
in the equilibrium concept. For example, Acemoglu and Jensen (2010) find that sometimes
individual strategies may respond differently to exogenous shocks if players take their impact
on the aggregate into account. In this respect, the following proposition shows that we find the
same inequality effects induced by an increase in the common prize value dV > 0 in case of
Nash equilibria, at least in the present contest model.
Proposition B.7 The inequality effects induced by dV are determined by the t-elasticity of
marginal costs alone. If Φ(i, t) = cit
γ, then p(·) is invariant to x. If Φ(i, t) = ctγi such that pi
is of Class I, then dV > 0 causes an OR of p(·).








proving the first claim. With iso-elastic costs we obtain ϕ(i, piT ) = γcipi
γ−1T γ−1. By (57), this
60It is straightforward to verify by the same arguments we use in Theorem B.3 that this characterization of
Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the standard one.
61A formal advantage of the model in the main text is that it yields a more tractable structure. The respective
FOC is V = ϕ(i, piT )T . For given pi, T marginal costs are thus higher if the own effect on the aggregate are














from which Rij = 0 follows. A similar argument together with the fact that T
′(V ) > 0 shows
that Rij > 0 if Φ is iso-elastic with exponents γi that increase over agent types, which shows
the OR of p(·). 
Related Literature Our approach contributes to the literature on aggregative games by
adding a set of tools aimed at studying the inequality effects induced by exogenous variations.
With respect to comparative-statics, most of the existing literature has focused on the effects on
aggregate quantities or the individual strategies (Corchon, 1994; Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013).
For example, Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) are interested under what conditions the aggregate,
extremal quantities or the individual actions are monotonic in the parameters of the game. By
contrast, our approach allows us to study the distributional patterns induced by varying common
parameters. Distributional effects may arise even if the individual strategies are monotonic. As
the simple contest example shows, none of our tools require a monotonic structure of the game.
Moreover, the reformulation of the game as a competition for market shares endows us with an
additional tool of deriving the comparative-statics of the aggregate T (see Section 3.3), which
may be simpler to evaluate than other methods in certain applications.62
B.6 Inequality Effects of Market Power?
In this section, we revisit the case of CES-demand but, contrary to Section 4.1, we assume a
perfectly competitive behavior of firms. This simple variation allows us to determine to what
extent the observed inequality patterns depend on market power as embodied by monopolistic
competition, at least if demand follows the CES-pattern.
Consider a unit mass of consumers endowed with CES utility (23), such that the total demand
for firm i is given by (24) where, only for simplicity, we set ri = 1 ∀i ∈ I. Like in Section 4.1,
Pi and qi denote the price and quantity, respectively, of firm i ∈ [0, 1], and we let pi ≡ Piqi∫
I Psqs





The only difference to monopolistic competition is that each firm i now takes the price Pi as
given. Assuming the same cost structure as in Section 4.1 yields




62The procedure outlined there also applies to the case of Nash equilibria.
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as the relevant payoff function. The only differences of (58) to its monopolistic counterpart (26)
are that i) the preference parameter η does not enter (58) and ii) the price Pi enters (58) while
T does not. These differences are intuitive as perfectly competitive firms do not account for
consumer preferences, and they can influence their market share pi only via their choices of qi.
The latter further explains why a higher price Pi, ceteris paribus, has the effect of lowering the
costs of attaining a certain market share pi: A higher given price means that a given market
share can be maintained by producing less.
A final difference to monopolistic competition is that we shall assume γi > 1, meaning
that all firms are subject to decreasing returns to scale. This is needed to assure positive
equilibrium payoffs in case of perfect competition, while market power assured positive payoffs
in monopolistic competition also with linear costs.
A competitive (Walrasian) equilibrium is (p(·), T ) such that pi maximizes (58),
∫
I pidi = 1
and demand (24) equals supply for each i ∈ I. The definition of pi and equilibrium demand
(24) imply that Pi = (piT )
1








γi ≡ ϕ(i). (59)
Comparing (59) with (27) shows that both equilibrium equations have the same structure,
despite the different type of competition.63 Thus, perfect competition yields exactly the same
inequality prediction as the monopolistic competition model:
Proposition B.8 All results in Propositions 5 - 7 regarding market and payoff shares as well
as relative prices, relative profits and relative quantities also apply to perfect competition.
Proof: The claims regarding the market shares p(·), (relative) quantities and (relative) prices
follow from the fact that both models share a structurally identical equilibrium function ((27)
and (59)). Therefore, repeating the steps in Proposition 5 - 7 yield the same predictions. The
equilibrium payoff in perfect competition is Πi = piI
γi−1
γi
, and all claims about relative payoffs
and payoff shares s(·) can be established proceeding exactly as in the proofs of Propositions 5
- 7. 
An additional question we now can ask is whether the market power due to monopolistic com-
petition per se has an inequality effect for a given and fixed set of parameters. The following
63In fact, the only difference is that g(i) in monopolistic competition, ceteris paribus, is strictly smaller than
g(i) in perfect competition. This difference originates from the fact that the firms in monopolistic competition
account for the price effect when optimizing their payoffs.
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proposition shows that market power increases the level of all equilibrium payoffs, but in a way
that that does not affect the dispersion of market shares, independent of whether firms differ
in their returns to scale or not. However, market power leads to a more extreme dispersion of
the payoff shares, in the sense of a monotonic OR, provided that firms differ in their economies
of scale.
Proposition B.9 (Market Power Effects) If all firms have identical returns to scale (γi =
γ > 1 ∀i ∈ I), then the equilibrium market and payoff share functions p(·) s(·) are identical in
monopolistic and perfect competition, while each firm earns a strictly higher payoff in monop-
olistic competition. If firms differ in their returns to scale, then the equilibrium market share
function p(·) again is the same for both types of competition, while the equilibrium payoff share
in monopolistic competition is a monotonic OR of the one in perfect competition.
Proof: First, suppose that all firms have identical returns to scale, but otherwise are ordered
according to ci. Let p
M (·) and pC(·) denote the equilibrium market share function for monop-










, and pC(·) = pM (·) follows from Lemma 3. Further, equilibrium payoffs
in the perfect competition model are Πi = piI
γ−1
γ , while those in monopolistic competition












sC(·) = sM (·) follow, as well as ΠMi > ΠCi ∀i.
Now consider the case where the firms are ordered according to γi while ci = c ∀i. Proceeding
exactly as in the proof of Proposition 6 shows that (45) also holds with perfect competition,
implying that relative quantities and thus also relative market shares pipj must take on exactly
the same values in both models for any i, j ∈ I. As before, this assures that the market share









(γi − 1)η + 1
























∀j B i, which shows that
sM (·) must be a monotonic OR of sC(·) by Lemma 3. 
B.7 On the labor-leisure model
We now show that the result on dα generalizes beyond the case where costs are common-
elasticity functions, which complicates the analysis. Suppose that Φ(i, q(i)) is not restricted to
be a power function, and consider dα > 0. Then the results on pd(ic), q(ic)/q(jc), f(ic)/f(jc),
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w, T and aggregate labor supply in Proposition 12 remain valid provided that T ≤ w.64 To see
this, write firm FOC as p(i)T = ϕ−1(i, 1/w). Integration yields
T =
∫
ϕ−1(i, 1/w)di ≡ H(w),
with H ′(w) < 0. Setting T d = T implicitly defines w(α) by
H(w(α)) = α(w(α) + Π(w(α))). (60)
By the Envelope Theorem −∂wΠ(i) = Φ(i, q(i)) < q(i)ϕ(i, q(i)) = q(i)/w, where the inequality
follows from the strict concavity of Φ(i, ·) and Φ(i, 0) = 0, and the equality from firm FOC.
Integration yields −Π < T/w. By (60) we have
w′(α) =
w + Π
H ′(w)− α(1 + Π′(w))
.
The denominator is negative if T ≤ w, because then 1+Π′(w) ≥ 0, which assures that w′(α) < 0.
Then T ′(α) > 0, and the remaining claims follow from the proof of Proposition 12.
B.8 Competition with Logit-Demand
In this section we analyze the firm-side inequality effects implied by the Logit model of discrete
choice with products of possibly heterogeneous quality. The main findings are summarized as
follows. With Logit competition, the weakest firms have the strongest incentive to increase
the noisiness in the choice procedure, e.g., by using obfuscation tactics. The reason is that
increasing noise in the consumer-side product evaluation allows weaker firms to “catch up”
because market shares converge to each other once the deterministic part of utility becomes
less decisive. Further, we study how an import tax on domestic and foreign firms affects their
respective market shares in the domestic market. Such a tax implies the strongest domestic
firms to benefit most. Moreover, consumer education about the products is predominantly
driven by foreign firms, provided that the importing firms dominate domestic firms in terms of
their quality-cost relation.
The basic Logit model In this model, expected demand from a given consumer is a choice
probability system (Anderson et al., 1992). Specifically, we consider the Logit demand-system
of a single consumer (or a unit mass of identical consumers) with linear utility and Logit
noise parameter λ > 0, single-product suppliers, and no outside option. We later show that the
64If Φ(i, q(i)) = c(i)q(i)γ it can be shown that indeed T ≤ w must hold in equilibrium.
16
distributional comparative-statics of the Logit model with outside option are similar. Moreover,
if there is a measure L > 0 of iid consumers, then p(i)L would be the fraction of consumers
served by firm i. With respect to the distributional outcome, setting L = 1 is therefore wlog.
Firms i ∈ [0, 1] offer possibly different qualities, parametrized by a(i) ≥ 0. A firm’s market





where Pi is the price of product i. The market share p(i) depends negatively on Pi and positively
on a(i). Assuming risk neutral firms, a constant production cost c(i) of the good, and setting
T ≡
∫
eλ(a(s)−Ps), the (expected) profit of firm i is






Let a(·) be decreasing and c(·) increasing, such that p(i) is either of Class I or II. Each firm

























where the assumptions made on a(i), c(i) assure that z(i)− z(j) > 0 for any j B i. This shows
that the monotonic rotation property holds with the Logit, and an increase of λ yields an OR of
p(·). The parameter λ > 0 controls the noise in the logit. In the degenerate case where λ = 0,
the choice process is purely random in such that neither price nor quality have any influence
on choice probabilities, and uniform market shares (p(i) = 1) result in any equilibrium. An
increase in λ means that the price, i.e., the deterministic part of utility, becomes more decisive,
which always is associated with an increasing inequality of the market shares. This finding is
similar to the CES-case, where an increase in the substitution elasticity (also making prices
65Exponentiating (63), one can easily see that this model verifies Assumption 1, and hence a unique equilibrium
exists by Theorem B.2.
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“more decisive”) leads to an OR. It follows from (63) that Pi =
1
λ + c(i), showing that prices








= sign (c(i)− c(j)) ≤ 0
Because Π(i) = p(i)λ , relative payoffs increase in λ while industry profits
∫
Π(s)ds = 1λ decrease;
hence dλ > 0 always generates losers (dΠ(i) < 0 must hold for a positive-measure set of firms).
The interesting converse is that the weakest firms (in terms of low quality or high costs) have
the strongest incentive to increase the “noisiness” in the choice procedure (dλ < 0), e.g., by
resorting to obfuscation tactics (see, e.g., Ellison and Wolitzky, 2012).






















With symmetric firms we must have ∂Π(i)∂λ < 0 as then x(s) = 0. To see that profits of the best
firms can increase in λ, consider the two-types case with x(0) = 0 and x(1) = z(1)−z(0) = C <
0. If α ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of strong types, then ∂λΠ(0) > 0 iff α < −(1 − α)(1 + λC)eλC .
We can always find α ∈ (0, 1) small enough, such that this inequality is satisfied, provided that
λC < −1 (enough heterogeneity). Note that because ∂λ
∫
Π(i)di < 0, the losses of the poor
must always outweigh the gains of the rich.
Import competition and taxation In this variation, we study the distributional conse-
quences that an import tax has in the domestic market for home firms and importers using the
Logit framework.66 Suppose that the domestic market for the products is composed of home
(“H”) and foreign (“F”) firms, that export their products into home at an import tax of τ . Let
iH ∈ [0, 1] and iF ∈ [0, 1] index a home and foreign firm, respectively. Then the market share








, χ ∈ {H,F} ,



















s )dsF we obtain
Π(iH) =
(





a(iF )− (τ + c(iF ))− Ln(p(iF )T )λ
)
p(iF ),
which have the same formal structure as (62). It follows that (63) - (65) logically apply also
to this version of the model, where we replace c(i) by c(iF ) + τ if iF > 1/2.
67 Suppose that
heterogeneity is such that p(i) is Class I, and consider a small tax increase dτ > 0 which does
not change the ranking expressed by p(i). By (65) we see that such a change has no effects on
the relative market shares p(iH)p(jH) of domestic firms nor on the relative domestic market shares
of foreign firms p(iF )p(jF ) , but the relative market shares
p(iH)
p(iF )
of domestic firms to foreign firms
increases in τ (independent of whether iHBiF or iFBiH). Since by (64) we must have T ′(τ) < 0,
it follows again from (64) that p(iH) increases for any domestic firm and p(iF ) decreases for
any foreign firm. It follows that all domestic firms benefit from the import tax (dΠ(iH) > 0),
but in a way that leaves relative market shares and relative profits of domestic firms unaltered.
This implies that the strongest domestic firms benefit most from the tax in an absolute sense,
and essentially follows because the tax allows domestic firms to expand their quantities. From
(27) one can infer that all domestic prices PHi remain constant, while foreign prices P
F
i increase
isometrically with τ .
Finally, we note that dλ 6= 0 has similar effects as before. An additional interesting insight
here is, that if importers (F-firms) are comparably strong (meaning that z(iF ) − τ  z(iH)),
such that importing firms gain from dλ > 0, then importers have an incentive to reduce the
noisiness of consumer choice, e.g. by educating consumers. The opposite holds if importers are
comparably weak; we would then expect importers to blur or complicate consumer perception.
Logit-demand with an outside option In the Logit model of section B.8 we have assumed
that the consumer always purchases one alternative, but what if there is an outside option? A
simple way of incorporating an outside option into the Logit (see, e.g., Anderson et al., 1992)




, x = eλV0 .
67Note that the following analysis could also be reformulated as finding the effects of an idiosyncratic change
of costs, in the spirit of the example in Section 4.3, for a proper subset of all firms (no H-F-distinction), where
dτ quantifies a non-common cost innovation or regulation.
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If x = 0 this corresponds to the previous model, with a uniform quality level but heterogeneous
costs c(i). We have
∫
qidi < 1 iff x > 0, because with x > 0 there is a non-zero probability
that the consumer does not purchase at all. Define p(i) as the market share of i relative to total
supply, p(i) ≡ qi∫
qi
di. Then qi = p(i)
T
T+x , where T =
∫
e−λPs , and profits are









which is essentially (62) scaled by a positive number. Hence (63) - (65) remain valid for x > 0
(with the reinterpretation of p(i)), and the main distributional effects of λ are preserved. In
particular, an increase in λ leads to an OR of p(·) and increases relative profits as well as relative
prices PiPj (because c(i) < c(j), j B i). Moreover, a change in the value of the outside option
(dx 6= 0) has no equilibrium effects on market shares nor on relative profits nor on relative
(expected) quantities supplied. By (63) prices Pi are invariant to x, and by (64) T
′(x) = 0,
showing that the only effect of (a change in) the outside option is to change individual and
aggregate supply, and to scale all equilibrium profits by a factor, while preserving market shares
and market prices.68
68Note however that quantity differences, qi − qj > 0, and profit differences Π(i)−Π(j) > 0 decrease in x.
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